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1.  Introduction 8
 In the welfarist tradition of social-choice theory, egalitarianism means equality of 9
welfare or utility1.   Conservative critics of egalitarianism rightly protest that it is highly 10
questionable that this kind of equality is ethically desirable, as it fails to hold persons 11
responsible for their choices, or for their preferences, or for the way they process 12
outcomes into some interpersonally comparable currency that one can speak of 13
equalizing.     In political philosophy, beginning with John Rawls (1958, 1971), this 14
critique was taken seriously, and a new approach to egalitarianism transpired, which 15
inserted personal responsibility as an important qualifier of the degree of equality that is 16
ethically desirable.   Thus, the development of egalitarian theory, since Rawls, may be 17
characterized as an effort to replace equality of outcomes with equality of opportunities, 18
where opportunities are interpreted in various ways.     Metaphors associated with this 19
view are ‘leveling the playing field,’ and ‘starting gate equality.’     The main 20
philosophical contributions to the discussion were, following Rawls, from Amartya Sen 21
(1980), Ronald Dworkin (1981a, 1981b),  Richard Arneson (1989) and G.A. Cohen 22
                                                
* We thank Tony Atkinson, François Bourguignon, Marc Fleurbaey, and Erik Schokkaert 
for their comments on previous drafts of his chapter. 
1 Welfarism is the view that social welfare (or the social objective function) should be 
predicated only on the utility levels of individuals; that is, that the only information 
required to compare social alternatives is that summarized in the utility-possibilities sets 
those alternatives generate.  It is a special case of consequentialism.  See chapter 3 for 
further discussion. 
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(1989)2.  The debate is said to be about ‘equality of what,’ and the philosophical view is 23
sometimes called ‘luck egalitarianism,’ a term coined by Elizabeth Anderson (1999). 24
 Economists (besides Sen) have been involved in this discussion from 1985 25
onwards.  John Roemer (1993, 1998) proposed an algorithm for calculating policies that 26
would equalize opportunities for achievement of a given objective in a population. Marc 27
Fleurbaey  and François Maniquet contributed economic proposals beginning in the 28
1990s, and recently summarized in Fleurbaey (2008).  Other authors who have 29
contributed to the theory include Walter Bossert (1995, 1997), Vito Peragine (2004), and 30
Dirk Van de gaer ( 1993).  An empirical literature is rapidly developing, calculating the 31
extent to which opportunities for the acquisition of various objectives are unequal in 32
various countries, and whether people hold views of justice consonant with equality of 33
opportunity.34
   There are various ways of summarizing the significance of these developments 35
for the economics of inequality.  Prior to the philosophical contributions that ignited the 36
economic literature that is our focus in this chapter, there was an earlier skirmish around 37
the practical import of equalizing opportunities.  Just prior to the publication of Rawls’s 38
magnum opus (1971), contributions by Arthur Jensen (1969)  and Richard Herrnstein 39
(1971) proposed that inequality was in the main due to differential intelligence (IQ), and 40
so generating a more equal income distribution by equalizing opportunities (for instance, 41
through compensatory education of under-privileged children) was a chimera.42
Economists Samuel Bowles (1973) and John Conlisk (1974) disagreed;  Bowles argued 43
that inequality of income was almost all due to unequal opportunities, not to the 44
heritability of IQ.   Despite this important debate on the degree to which economic 45
inequality is immutable, prior to Rawls, economists’ discussions of inequality were in the 46
main statistical, focusing on the best ways of measuring inequality.47
  The post-Rawls-Dworkin inequality literature changed the focus by pointing out 48
that only some kinds of inequality are ethically objectionable, and to the extent that 49
                                                
2 The philosophical literature generated by these pioneers is to large to list here.  Book-
length treatments that should be mentioned are Rakowski (1993) , Van Parijs (1997), and 
Hurley (2003) . 
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economists ignore this distinction, they may be measuring something that is not ethically 50
salient.   This distinction between morally acceptable and unacceptable inequality is 51
perhaps the most important contribution of philosophical egalitarian thought of the last 52
forty years.     From the perspective of social-choice theory, equal-opportunity theory has 53
sharply challenged the welfarist assumption that is classically ubiquitous, maintaining 54
that more information than final outcomes in terms of welfare is needed to render social 55
judgment about the ranking of alternative policies – in particular, one must know the 56
extent to which individuals are responsible for the outcomes they enjoy -- whether those 57
outcomes were determined by social (and perhaps genetic) factors beyond their control, 58
or not – and this is non-welfare information.59
 One must mention that another major non-welfarist theory of justice, but an 60
inegalitarian one, was proposed by Robert Nozick (1973) who argued that justice could 61
not be assessed by knowing only final outcomes; one had to know the process by which 62
these outcomes were produced.   His neo-Lockean view, which proposed a theory of the 63
moral legitimacy of private property,  can evaluate the justness of final outcomes only by 64
knowing whether the history that produced them was unpolluted by extortion, robbery, 65
slavery, and so on.  Simply knowing the distribution of final outcomes (in terms of 66
income, welfare, or whatever) does not suffice to pass judgment on the distribution’s 67
moral pedigree.   So the period since 1970 has been one in which, in political philosophy, 68
non-welfarist theories flourished, on both the right and left ends of the political spectrum.69
 In this chapter, we begin by summarizing the philosophical debate concerning 70
equality since Rawls (section 2), presenting economic algorithms for computing policies 71
which equalize opportunities – or, more generally, ways of ordering social policies with 72
respect to their efficacy in opportunity equalization (sections 3, 4 and 5), application of 73
the approach to the conceptualization of economic development (section 6), discussion of74
dynamic issues (section 7),  a preamble to a discussion of empirical work (section 8), 75
evidence of population views from surveys and experiments concerning conceptions of 76
equality (section 9), and a discussion of measurement issues, and summary of the 77
empirical literature on inequality of opportunity to date (section 10).   We conclude with 78




2.  Egalitarian political philosophy since Rawls 82
 John Rawls (1958) first published his ideas about equality over fifty years ago, 83
although his magnum opus did not appear until 1971.  His goal was to unseat 84
utilitarianism as the ruling theory of distributive justice, and to replace it with a type of 85
egalitarianism.    He argued that justice requires, after guaranteeing a system which 86
maximizes civil liberties, a set of institutions that maximize the level of ‘primary goods’ 87
allocated to those who are worst off in society, in the sense of receiving the least amount 88
of these goods.    Economists call this principle ‘maximin primary goods;’ Rawls often 89
called it the difference principle.  Moreover, he attempted to provide an argument for the 90
recommendation, based upon construction of a ‘veil of ignorance’ or ‘original position,’ 91
which shielded decision makers from knowledge of information about their situations 92
that was ‘morally arbitrary,’ so that the decision they came to regarding just allocation 93
would be impartial.    Thus Rawls’s (1971) project was to derive principles of justice 94
from rationality and impartiality.95
 Rawls did not advocate maxi-minning utility (even assuming interpersonal utility 96
comparisons were available), but rather maxi-minning (some index of) primary goods.97
This was, in part, his attempt to embed personal responsibility into the theory.  For Rawls, 98
welfare was best measured as the extent to which a person is fulfilling his plan of life: but 99
he viewed the choice of life plan as something up to the individual, which social 100
institutions had no business passing judgment upon.   Primary goods were deemed to be 101
those inputs that were required for the success of any life plan, and so equalizing 102
primary-goods bundles across persons (or passing to a maximin allocation which would103
dominate component-wise an equal allocation) was a way of holding persons responsible 104
for their life-plan choice.    The question of how to aggregate the various primary goods 105
into an index that would allow comparison of bundles was never successfully solved by 106
Rawls  (and some skeptical economists said that the subjective utility function was the 107
obvious way to aggregate primary goods).108
 Rawls defended the difference principle by arguing that it would be chosen by 109
decision makers who were rational, but were deprived of knowledge about their own 110
situations in the world, to the extent that this knowledge included information about their 111
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physical, social, and biological endowments, which were a matter of luck, and therefore 112
whose distribution Rawls described as morally arbitrary.  He named the venue in which 113
these souls would cogitate about justice the ‘original position.’  In the original position, 114
souls were assumed to know the laws of economics, and to be self-interested.  They were, 115
moreover, to be concerned with the allocation of primary goods, because they did not 116
know their life plans, or even the distribution of life plans in the actual society.  Nor were 117
they to know the distribution of physical and biological endowments in society. 118
   Here we believe Rawls made a major conceptual error.  If the veil of ignorance 119
is intended to shield decision makers from knowledge of aspects of their situations that 120
are morally arbitrary, and only of those aspects, they should know their plans of life, 121
which, by hypothesis, are not morally arbitrary, because Rawls deems that persons are 122
responsible for their life plans.  Secondly, although a person’s particular endowment of 123
resources, natural and physical, might well be morally arbitrary ( to the extent that these 124
were determined by the luck of the birth lottery),  the distribution of these resources is a 125
fact of nature and society, and should be known by the denizens in the original position, 126
just as they are assumed to know the laws of economics.  Therefore, Rawls constructed 127
his veil too thickly, on two counts, given his philosophical views.128
 Given the paucity of information available to the decision makers in the original 129
position, it is not possible to use classical decision theory to solve the problem of the 130
desirable allocation of primary goods.    Indeed, the only precise arguments that Rawls 131
gives for the conclusion that the difference principle would be chosen in the original 132
position occur at Rawls (1999[1971], p. 134), and they essentially state that decision 133
makers are extremely risk averse.   For example: 134
135
The second feature that suggests the maximin rule is the 136
following: the person choosing has a conception of the good such 137
that he cares very little, if anything, for what he might gain about 138
the minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be sure of by following 139
the maximin rule.  It is not worthwhile for him to take a chance 140
for the sake of further advantage, especially when it may turn out 141
that he loses much that is important to him.    The last provision 142
brings in the third feature, namely, that the rejected alternatives 143




But extreme risk aversion, which Rawls here depends upon for his justification of 147
maximin, is certainly not an aspect of rationality.148
 Thus, despite its enormous influence in political philosophy, Rawls’s argument 149
for maximin is marred in two ways:  first, its reliance on deducing the principle of justice 150
from the original position was crucially flawed in depriving the denizens of that position 151
of knowledge of features of themselves (life plans) and of the world (the distributions of 152
various kinds of resources, including genetic ones, and ones possessed by families into 153
which a person is born) which were not morally arbitrary3, and second, for its assumption 154
(despite claims to the contrary by Rawls and others) that decision makers were extremely 155
risk averse.  The value of Rawls’s contribution is in stating a radical egalitarian position 156
about the injustice of receiving resources through luck – and, in particular, the luck of the 157
birth lottery – and that it shifted the equalisandum from utility to a kind of resource, 158
primary goods.    In our view, however, the project of deducing equality or maximin from 159
rationality and impartiality alone was a failure.  Indeed, Moreno-Ternero and Roemer 160
(2008)  argue that some solidaristic postulate is necessary to deduce maximin or, more 161
generally, to deduce some kind of egalitarianism as the ordering principle for social 162
choice.  Although egalitarians might wish to deduce their view from postulates that can 163
garner universal approval  (like rationality and impartiality), this is not possible.164
Therefore, an egalitarian theory of justice cannot have universal appeal, if the solidaristic165
postulate, which we believe necessary,  is contentious. 166
 Although Rawls is usually viewed as the most important egalitarian political 167
philosopher of the twentieth century, one may challenge the claim that his view is 168
egalitarian: to wit, the just income distribution, for Rawls, allows incentive payments to 169
the highly skilled in order to elicit their productive activity, even though this produces 170
inequality.   The main philosopher who challenges Rawls’s acceptance of incentive-based 171
income inequality is G.A. Cohen, upon which more below.172
                                                
3 We reiterate it is the distribution of traits which is a fact of nature, and hence not 
morally arbitrary, while the endowment of a given individual may well be morally 
arbitrary, in the sense of being due to luck. 
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 In 1981, Ronald Dworkin published two articles that essentially addressed the 173
problems in the Rawlsian argument that we have summarized, although he did not use the 174
Rawlsian language (original position, primary goods).   His project was to define a 175
conception of equality that was ethically sound.   In the first of these articles, he argued 176
that ‘equality of welfare’ was not a sound view, mainly because equality of welfare does 177
not hold persons responsible for their preferences.   In particular, Dworkin argued that if 178
a person has expensive tastes, and he identifies with those tastes, society does not owe 179
him an additional complement of resources to satisfy them.    (The only case of expensive 180
tastes, says Dworkin, that justifies additional resources are those tastes that are addictions 181
or compulsions, tastes with which the person does not ‘identify,’ and would prefer he did 182
not have.)   In the second article, Dworkin argues for ‘equality of resources,’ where 183
resources include (as for Rawls) aspects of a person’s physical and biological 184
environment for which he should not be held responsible (such as those acquired through 185
birth).186
 But how can one ‘equalize resources,’ when these comprise both transferable 187
goods, like money, and inalienable resources, like talents, families into which persons are 188
born, and even genes?   Dworkin proposed an ingenious device, an insurance market 189
carried out behind a veil of ignorance, where the ‘souls’ participating represent actual 190
persons, and know the preferences of those whom they represent, but do not know the 191
resources with which their persons are actually endowed in the world.    In this insurance 192
market, each participant would hold an equal amount of some currency, and would be 193
able to purchase insurance with that currency against bad luck in the birth lottery, that is, 194
the lottery in which nature assigns souls to persons in the world (or resource endowments 195
to souls).     Dworkin argued that the allocation of goods that would be implemented after 196
the birth lottery occurred, the state of the world was revealed, and insurance policies 197
taken behind the Dworkinian veil were settled, was an allocation that ‘equalized 198
resources.’   It held persons responsible for their preferences – in particular, their risk 199
preferences—and was egalitarian because all souls were endowed, behind the veil, with 200
the same allotment of currency with which to purchase insurance.    Impartiality with 201
respect to the morally arbitrary distribution of resources was accomplished by shielding 202
the souls from knowledge of their endowments in the actual world associated with the 203
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birth lottery (genetic and physical).  Thus, Dworkin retained Rawls’s radical egalitarian 204
view about the moral arbitrariness of the distribution of talents, handicaps, and inherited 205
wealth, but implemented a mechanism that held persons responsible for their tastes that 206
was much cleaner than discarding preferences and relying on primary goods, as Rawls 207
had done. 208
 Despite the cleverness of  Dworkin’s construction, it can lead to results that many 209
egalitarians would consider perverse.  To illustrate the problem, consider the following 210
example. Suppose there are two individuals in the world, Andrea and Bob.   Andrea is 211
lucky: she has a fine constitution, and can transform resources (wealth) into welfare at a 212
high rate.   Bob is handicapped; his constitution transforms wealth into welfare at exactly 213
one-half of Andrea’s rate.   We assume, in particular, that Andrea and Bob have 214
interpersonally comparable welfare.   The internal resource that Andrea possesses and 215
Bob lacks is a fine biological constitution (say, a healthy supply of endorphins).216
 We assume that Bob and Andrea have the same risk preferences over wealth: they 217
are each risk averse and have the von Neumann – Morgenstern utility function over 218
wealth .   Suppose that the distribution of (material) wealth in the world to 219
(Andrea, Bob) would be , with no further intervention.  Thus each individual is 220
endowed with an internal constitution and some external resource. 221
 We construct Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance market as follows4.  Behind the 222
veil of ignorance, there is a soul Alpha who represents Andrea, and a soul Beta who 223
represents Bob.   These souls know the risk preferences of their principals, and the 224
constitutions of Andrea and Bob, but they do not know which person they will become in 225
the birth lottery.   Thus, from their viewpoint, there are two possible states of the world, 226
summarized in the table: 227
228
   229
State 1 Alpha becomes Andrea Beta becomes Bob 
State 2 Alpha becomes Bob Beta becomes Andrea 
                                                
4 Dworkin did not propose a formal model, but relied on intuition.  The model here is a 
version of an Arrovian market for contingent claims. 
u(W ) = W
(W A ,W B )
9
 230
Each state occurs with probability one-half. We know that state 1 will indeed occur, but 231
the souls face a birth lottery with even chances, in which they can take out insurance 232
against bad luck (that is, of becoming Bob). 233
 There are two commodities in the insurance market: a commodity , a unit of 234
which pays the owner $1 if state 1 occurs, and a commodity  a unit of which pays $1 if 235
state 2 occurs.  Each soul can either purchase or sell these commodities: selling one unit 236
of the first commodity entails a promise to deliver $1 if state 1 occurs.   Each soul 237
possesses, initially, zero income (behind the veil) with which to purchase these 238
commodities.  In particular, they have equal wealth endowments behind the veil in the 239
currency that is recognized in that venue.  Thus, the insurance market acts to redistribute 240
tangible wealth in the actual world to compensate persons for their natural endowments, 241
which cannot be altered, in that way which the souls, who represent persons, would 242
desire, had they been able to insure against the luck of the birth lottery.  It is an institution 243
that transforms what Dworkin calls ‘brute luck’ into ‘option luck.’   The former is luck 244
which is not insurable; the latter is luck whose outcome is protected by insurance, or the 245
outcome of a gamble one has chosen to take. 246
 An equilibrium in this insurance market consists of prices  for commodities 247
 , demands   by souls Alpha and Beta for the two contingent 248
commodities, such that249
(1)    250
(2)251
(3)   . 252
 Let us explain these conditions.   Condition (1) says that Alpha chooses her 253




(x1,x2 ) (x1 ,x2 ),(x1 ,x2 )
(x1 ,x2 ) maximizes  
1
2
W A + x1 +
1
2
W B + x2
2
subj. to x1 + px2 = 0
(x1 ,x2 ) maximizes  
1
2
W B + x1 +
1
2
2(W A + x2 )
subj. to x1 + px2 = 0
xs + xs = 0 for s = 1,2
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she maximizes her expected utility.   Her utility if she becomes Andrea (state 1), will be 255
 .   Now if Alpha becomes Bob (state 2), her wealth will be  ; 256
however,  from the viewpoint of her principal, Andrea, that will generate only half as 257
much welfare, so she evaluates this wealth as being worth, in utility terms,  .     258
Condition (2) has a similar derivation, but this time, soul Beta takes the benchmark 259
situation as becoming Bob.   Condition (3) says that both markets clear. 260
 The equilibrium is given by 261
262
Now state 1 occurs.  Therefore Andrea, after the insurance contracts are settled, ends up 263
with wealth   -- two-thirds of the total wealth—and Bob ends up 264
with one-third of the total wealth.  The result is perverse because, Bob is the one with the 265
low resource endowment, that is, with a low ability to transform money into welfare.   It 266
is Bob, putatively, whom an equal-resource principle should compensate, but it is Andrea 267
who ends up the winner.5   Even should state 2 have occurred, the outcome would have 268
been the same – two-thirds of the wealth would end up being Andrea’s.269
                                                
5 This perversity of the Dworkin insurance mechanism was first pointed out by Roemer 
(1985).  Dworkin never proposed a model of the insurance market, but conjectured that it 
would re-allocate wealth in a way to compensate those with a paucity of non-transferable 
resources.  He continued to use the insurance-market thought experiment to justify social 
policies (e.g., in the case of national health insurance for the United States), even though 
his thought experiment did not necessarily produce the compensatory redistributions that 
he thought it would implement. 
W1
A + x1 W
B + x2
W B + x2
2
p = 1, (x1 ,x2 ) = (





), (x1 ,x2 ) = (
2W B +W A
3
, W
A + 2W B
3
).
W A + x1 =
2
3
(W A +W B )
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  Why does this happen?   Because, even though both souls are risk averse, they are 270
not sufficiently risk averse to induce them to shift wealth into the bad state (of being born 271
Bob); it is more worthwhile (in terms of expected utility) to use wealth in the state when 272
it can produce a lot of welfare (when a soul turns out to be Andrea).    If the agents were 273
sufficiently risk averse, this would not occur.  (If the utility function were , 274
and , then, post-insurance,  Bob would end up with more wealth than Andrea. If the 275
utility function is u(W ) = logW  , then the agents split the wealth equally.)  But the 276
example shows that in general the hypothetical insurance market does not implement the 277
kind of compensation that Dworkin desires: for Bob is the one who suffers from a deficit 278
in an internal resource – from morally arbitrary bad luck.     For Dworkin’s insurance 279
market to avoid this kind of perversity, individuals would have to be sufficiently risk 280
averse, and this it is inappropriate to assume, for the theory should surely produce the 281
desired result (of compensating those with a paucity of internal resources) in the special 282
case that all agents have the same risk preferences6.283
 In the model just presented of the hypothetical insurance market, note that it was 284
necessary to make interpersonal welfare comparisons.    Alpha, Andrea’s soul, has to 285
contemplate how she would feel, if she were to be born as Bob, and with a given amount 286
of wealth.  She does this by transforming Bob’s wealth into a welfare-equivalent wealth287
for Andrea.   And soul Beta has to make a similar interpersonal comparison.  We 288
maintain that it is impossible to construct a veil-of-ignorance thought experiment without 289
making such comparisons.    The point is simple: if a soul has to compare how it would 290
feel when being incarnated as different persons, it must be able to make interpersonal 291
                                                
6 When Dworkin was confronted with this example at a conference in Halifax in 1985, he 
responded that he would not use the insurance device in cases where it produced the 
‘pathological’ result.  This is, however, probably an unworkable position, for how does 
one characterize a priori the set of admissible economic environments? 
       This is not the first time that insufficient concavity of preferences causes problems 
for economic analysis.  See, for example, the discussion of money-metric utility in 
chapter 3.
u(W ) =W c / c
c < 0
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welfare comparisons.   Without the ability to compare the lives of different persons in 292
different circumstances, an investment in insurance would have no basis7.293
 Despite the problem we have exhibited with Dworkin’s proposal, it was 294
revolutionary, in the words of G.A. Cohen, in transporting into egalitarian theory the 295
most powerful tool of the anti-egalitarian Right, the importance of personal responsibility.  296
One might argue, after seeing the above demonstration, that Dworkin’s insurance market 297
is an appealing thought experiment, and therefore one should give up on the egalitarian 298
impulse of compensating persons for features of their situations for which they are not 299
responsible: that is, instead of rejecting Dworkin’s model as inadequate, one should reject 300
his egalitarian desideratum.   Moreno and Roemer (2008) consider this, and argue instead 301
that the veil of ignorance is an inappropriate thought experiment for ascertaining what 302
justice requires.  Although their arguments for this are new, the position is not: it was also 303
advocated earlier by Brian Barry (1991).304
 In the example we have given, there is, for egalitarians, a moral requirement to 305
transfer tangible wealth from Andrea to Bob, because Bob lacks an inalienable resource 306
that Andrea possesses, the ability to transform effectively goods into welfare, a lack 307
which is beyond his control, and due entirely to luck.    Dworkin also focused upon a 308
different possible cause of unequal welfares, that some persons have expensive tastes, 309
while others have cheap ones.    His view was that persons with expensive tastes do not310
merit additional wealth in order to satisfy them, as long as those persons were satisfied 311
with their tastes, or, as he said, identified with them.   There is no injustice in a world 312
where wealth is equal, but those with champagne tastes suffer compared to those with 313
beer tastes, due to the relative consumptions of champagne and beer that that equal 314
wealth permits.  So the ‘pathology’ that we have illustrate with the Andrea-Bob example 315
                                                
7 Readers may recall that Harsanyi (1955) claimed to construct a veil-of-ignorance 
argument for utilitarianism without making interpersonal comparisons.  But his argument 
fails – not as a formal mathematical statement, but in the claim that utilitarianism is what 
has been justified.  (See, for an early discussion, Weymark (1991), and for a more recent 
one, Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2008).) 
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depends upon the source of Bob’s relative inefficiency in converting wealth into welfare 316
being a handicap, rather than an expensive taste. 317
 Slightly before Dworkin’s articles were published, Amartya Sen (1980) gave a 318
lecture in which he argued that Rawls’s focus on primary goods was misplaced.    Sen 319
argued that Rawls was ‘fetishist’ in focusing on goods, and should instead have focused 320
on what goods provide for people, which he called ‘functionings’ – being able to move 321
about, to become employed, to be healthy, and so on.    Sen defined a person’s capability322
as the set of vectors of functionings that were available to him, and he called for equality 323
of capabilities8.   Thus, although a rich man on a hunger strike might have the same (low) 324
functioning as a poor man starving, their capabilities are very different.   While not going 325
so far as to say utilities should be equalized, Sen defined a new concept between goods 326
and welfare – functionings—which G.A. Cohen (1993) later described as providing a 327
state of being that he called ‘midfare.’  For Sen, the opportunity component of the theory 328
was expressed in an evaluation not of a person’s actual functioning level, but of what 329
functionings were available to him, his ‘capability.’330
 Sen’s contribution led to both theoretical and practical developments.  On the 331
theoretical level, it inspired a literature on comparing opportunity (or feasible) sets: if one 332
desires to ‘equalize’ capabilities, it helps to have an ordering on sets of  sets.  See James 333
Foster’s (2011) summary of this literature.  On the practical side, it led to the human 334
development index, published annually by the UNDP.  For development of Sen’s 335
capability approach, see chapter 3.336
 Later in the decade, further reactions to Dworkin came from philosophers, notably 337
Richard Arneson (1989) and G.A. Cohen (1989).   Arneson argued that Dworkin’s338
expensive-taste argument against equality-of-welfare was correct, but his alternative of 339
seeking equality of resources was not the only option: instead, one should seek to 340
equalize opportunities for welfare.  This, he argued, would take care of the expensive-341
tastes problem.    Rather than relying on the insurance mechanism to define what resource 342
egalitarianism means, Arneson proposed to distribute resources so that all persons had 343
equal opportunity for welfare achievement, although actual welfares achieved would 344
                                                
8 Sen has not proposed an ordering of sets that would enable one to compare capabilities. 
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differ because people would make different choices.    There are problems with 345
formalizing Arneson’s proposal (see Roemer (1996)) , but it is notable for not relying on 346
any kind of veil of ignorance, in contrast to the  proposals of Rawls and Dworkin. 347
 Cohen (1989) criticized Dworkin for making the wrong ‘cut’ between resources 348
and preferences.   The issue, he said, was what people should or should not be held 349
responsible for.   Clearly, a person should not be held responsible for his innate talents 350
and inherited resources, but it is not true that a person should be fully responsible for his 351
preferences either, because preferences are to some (perhaps large) degree formed in 352
circumstances (in particular, those of one’s childhood) which are massively influenced by 353
resource availability.   Indeed, if a person has an expensive taste for champagne due to a 354
genetic abnormality, he would merit compensation under an egalitarian ethic9.     Cohen’s 355
view was that inequality is justified if and only if it is attributable to choices that are ones 356
for which persons can sensibly he held responsible -- so if a person who grows up poor, 357
develops a ‘taste’ against education, induced by the difficulty of succeeding in school due 358
to lack of adequate resources – a taste with which he even comes to ‘identify’ – then 359
Cohen would not hold him responsible for the low income due to his consequently low 360
wage, while Dworkin presumably would hold him responsible.   Cohen does not propose 361
a mechanism or algorithm for finding the just distribution of resources, but provides a 362
number of revealing examples (see, for example, Cohen (1989, 2004)).  He calls his 363
approach ‘equal access to advantage.’364
 Besides criticizing Dworkin for his partition the space of attributes and actions 365
into ones for which compensation is, or is not, due, Cohen (1997), importantly, critiqued 366
Rawls’s difference principle, as insufficiently egalitarian.  The argument is based upon 367
Rawls’s restriction of the ambit of justice to the design of social institutions – in 368
particular, that ambit does not include personal behavior.    Thus, the Rawlsian tax system 369
should attempt to maximize the welfare of the least-well-off group in society, under the 370
assumption that individuals choose their labor supplies to maximize their personal utility.371
                                                
9 This is not a crazy example.  There is a medically recognized syndrome in which people 
who sustain a certain kind of brain injury come to crave expensive foods: see Cohen 
(2011, p. 81). 
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Suppose the highly skilled claim that if their taxes are raised from 30% to 50%, they will 372
reduce their labor supply so much that the worst-off group would be less well off than it 373
is at the 30% tax rate.  If 30% is the tax rate that maximizes the welfare (or income) of 374
the least well off, given this self-interested behavior of the highly skilled, then it is the 375
Rawlsian-just rate.   But Cohen responds that, as long as the highly skilled are at least as 376
well off as the worst off at the 50% tax rate, then justice requires the 50% tax rate.  This 377
difference of viewpoint between Rawls and Cohen occurs because Cohen requires 378
individuals to act, in their personal choices, according to the commands of the difference 379
principle  (that is, to take those actions that render those who are worst off as well off as 380
possible), and Rawls does not.   Indeed, Rawls stipulates that one requirement of a just 381
society is that its members endorse the conception of justice.  It is peculiar, Cohen 382
remarks, that that conception should apply only to the design of social institutions, and 383
not to personal behavior.384
 A question that arises from the discussion of responsibility is its relationship to 385
freedom of the will.  If responsibility has become central in the conceptualization of just 386
equality, does one have to solve the problem of free will before enunciating a theory of 387
distributive justice?  Different answers are on offer.   We believe the most practical 388
answer, which should suffice for practicing economists,  is to view the degree of 389
responsibility of persons as a parameter in a theory of equality.  Once one assigns a value 390
to this parameter, then one has a particular theory of equality of opportunity, because one 391
then knows for what to hold persons responsible.    The missing parameter is supplied by 392
each society, which has a concept of what its citizens should be held responsible for; 393
hence there is a specific theory of equality of opportunity for each society, that is, a 394
theory that will deliver policy recommendations consonant with the theory of 395
responsibility that that society endorses.  This is a political approach, rather than a 396
metaphysical one. 397
    Another answer to the free-will challenge is to make a distinction prevalent 398
among philosophers.   ‘Compatibilists’ are those philosophers who believe that it is 399
consistent both to endorse determinism  (in the sense of a belief in the physical causation 400
of all behavior) and the possibility of responsibility;  incompatibilists are those who 401
believe that determinism precludes responsibility.  Most philosophers (who think about 402
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the problem) are probably, at present, compatibilists.   For instance, Thomas Scanlon 403
(1986) believes that the determinist causal view is true, but also that persons can be held 404
responsible for their behavior, as long as they have contemplated their actions, weighed 405
alternatives, and so on.     (The issue of sufficient contemplation is independent of the 406
issue of the cause of expensive tastes, raised above.)    From a practical viewpoint, the 407
problem of free will therefore does not pose a problem for designing policies motivated 408
by the idea that persons should not be held accountable for aspects of their condition that 409
are due to circumstances beyond their control.    410
 The philosophical literature on ‘responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism’ continues 411
beyond the point of this quick review, but enough summary has been provided to proceed 412
to a discussion of economic models. 413
414
3.   A model and algorithm for equal-opportunity policy 415
Consider a population, whose members are partitioned into a finite set of types.  A 416
type comprises the set of individuals with the same circumstances, where circumstances417
are those aspects of one’s environment (including, perhaps, one’s biological 418
characteristics) which are beyond one’s control, and influence outcomes of interest.419
Denote the types  .  Let the population fraction of type t in the population be 420
 .  There is an objective for which a planner wishes to equalize opportunities.   The 421
degree to which an individual will achieve the objective is a function of his circumstances, 422
his effort, and the social policy:  we write the value of the objective as  , where e423
is a measure of effort and   , the set of social policies.  Indeed,  should be 424
considered the average achievement of the objective among those of type t expending 425
effort e when the policy is .   Here, we will take effort to be a non-negative real number.  426
Later, we will introduce luck into the problem. 427
 is not, in general, a subjective utility function: indeed  is assumed to be 428
monotone increasing in effort, while subjective utility is commonly assumed to be 429
decreasing in standard conceptions of effort.   Thus, u might be the adult wage, 430
circumstances could include several aspects of childhood and family environment, and e431







although that choice may be severely constrained by circumstances, a point to which we 433
will attend below.  The final data for the problem consist of the distributions of effort 434
within types as a function of policy:  for the policy , denote the distribution function of 435
effort in type t as Gt ( )  .   We would normally say that effort is chosen by the individual 436
by maximizing a preference order, but preferences are not the fundamentals of this 437
theory: rather, the data are {T ,Gt , f t ,u, }   , where we use T to denote, also, the set of 438
types.439
Defining the set of types and the conception of effort assumes that the society in 440
question has a conception of the partition between responsible actions and circumstances, 441
with respect to which it wishes to compute a consonant approach to equalizing 442
opportunities.  We describe the approach of Roemer (1993, 1998).   The verbal statement 443
of the goal is to find that policy which nullifies, to the greatest extent possible, the effect 444
of circumstances on outcomes, but allows outcomes to be sensitive to effort.  Effort 445
comprises those choices that are thought to be the person’s responsibility, and hence they 446
are consequences of his choices – but not all such consequences, since effort may itself 447
be influenced by one’s circumstances.  In particular, the distribution of effort in a type at 448
a policy, , is not due to the actions of any person  (assume here a continuum of agents), 449
but is a characteristic of the type.  If we are to indemnify individuals against their 450
circumstances, we must not hold them responsible for being members of a type with a 451
poor distribution of effort.452
We require a measure of accountable effort, which, because effort is influenced 453
by circumstances, cannot be the raw effort e.  (Think of years of education – raw effort—454
which is surely influenced in a major way by social circumstances.)   Roemer proposed to 455
measure accountable effort as the rank of an individual on the effort distribution of her 456
type: thus, if for an individual expending effort e,  , we say the individual 457
expended the degree of effort  , as opposed to the level of effort e.  The rank provides a 458
way of making inter-type comparisons of the efforts expended by individuals.   A person 459
is judged accountable, that is to say, by comparing his behavior only to others with his 460




rank measure, which sterilizes the distribution of raw effort of the influence of 462
circumstances upon it10.463
Because the functions  are assumed to be strictly monotone increasing in e, it 464
follows that an individual will have the same rank on the distribution of the objective, 465
within his type, as he does within the distribution of effort of his type11.  Define: 466
    467
where   is the level of effort at the   quantile of the distribution  , that is, 468
 .   Then the functions   are the inverse functions of the distribution 469
functions of the objective, by type, under the policy  .   (In this sense, vt  is like Pen’s 470
parade, which is also the inverse of a distribution function.)     Inequality of opportunity 471
holds when these functions are not identical.   In particular, because we are viewing 472
persons at a given rank  as being equally accountable with respect to the choice of 473
effort, the vertical difference between the functions   is a measure of the extent 474
of inequality of opportunity (or, equivalently, the horizontal distance between the 475
cumulative distribution functions). 476
 What policy is the optimal one, given this conception?  We do not simply want to 477
render the functions  identical at a low level, so we need to adopt some conception of 478
‘maxi-minning’ these functions.    We want to choose that policy which pushes up the 479
lowest vt  function as much as possible – and as in Rawlsian maximin, the ‘lowest’ 480
function may itself be a function of what the policy is.  A natural approach is therefore to 481
                                                
10 Some authors (Ramos and Van de gaer (2012)) have called this move – of identifying 
the degree of effort with the rank of the individual on the objective distribution of his 
type – the Roemer Identification Assumption (RIA).  While the name is lofty, the idea is 
simple: persons should not be held responsible for characteristics of the distribution of 
effort in their type, for that distribution is a circumstance. 
11 If actual effort is a vector, then a unidimensional measure e would be constructed, for 
example, by regressing the objective values against the dimensions, thus computing 
weights on the dimensions of raw effort. 
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maximize the area below the lowest function , or more precisely, to find that policy 482
which maximizes the area under the lower envelope of the functions .  The formal 483
statement is to: 484
    .   (3.1) 485
We call the solution to this program the opportunity-equalizing policy,   .    486
(Computing (3.1) is equivalent to maximizing the area to the left of the left-hand 487
envelope of the type-distributions of the objective, and bounded above by the horizontal 488
line of height one.) 489
 In the case in which the lower envelope of the functions   is the function of a 490
single type (the unambiguously most disadvantaged type), what we have done is simply 491
to maximize the average value of the objective for the most disadvantaged type, since 492
  is simply the mean value of the objective for type t at policy  .    493
 Thus, the approach implements the view that differences between individuals 494
caused by their circumstances are ethically unacceptable, but differences due to 495
differential effort are all right.    Full equality of opportunity is achieved not when the 496
value of the objective is equal for all, but when members of each type face the same497
chances, as measured by the distribution functions of the objective that they face. 498
 One virtue of the approach taken here is that it is easy to illustrate graphically.  In 499
Figure 1,  we present two graphs, to illustrate inequality of opportunity in Hungary and 500
Denmark.   In each graph, there are three cumulative income distributions, corresponding 501
to male workers of three types: those whose more educated parent had no more than 502
lower secondary education, those whose more educated parent just completed secondary 503
education, and those whose more educated parent had at least some tertiary education.504
(The data are from EU-SILC-2005.)   The inverses of these distribution functions are the 505
functions  defined above.   The policy is the status-quo policy.  It seems clear that, 506
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Figure 1a   Three income distribution functions for Danish male workers, according the 513
circumstance of parental education. (Darkest hue are from least highly educated 514
backgrounds)515
516
                                                




Figure 1b.  As in Figure 1a, but for Hungary 518
519
 The approach inherent in (3.1) is one which treats all causes of inequality not 520
accounted for by a person’s type as being due to effort.   For example, with respect figure 521
1, there are many circumstances which influence outcomes not accounted for in the 522
definition of type, and so the inequality of opportunity illustrated in that figure should be 523
considered to be a lower bound on the true inequality of opportunity.  Nevertheless, it is 524
often the case that delineating only a few circumstances will suffice to illustrate obvious 525
inequality of opportunity, and one can say that social policy should attempt to mitigate at 526
least that inequality.527
 Let us note that the equal-opportunity approach is non-welfarist or more precisely 528
non-consequentialist.  A welfarist procedure for ordering social policies uses information 529
only in the objective possibilities sets of the population associated with those procedures.530
In the income example, it would use only the data of the income distribution of the 531
population, and ignore the data of what individuals were of what types.  Circumstances 532
are non-welfare  (or non-objective) information.    More informally, consequentialism533
only considers the final results of policies (incomes), and not the causes of those 534
consequences.   Here, we say there are two kinds of cause of outcomes with different 535
moral status: circumstances and effort.   We must distinguish between these causes, and 536
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social policy should attempt to mitigate the inequality effects of one of them, but not 537
necessarily of the other. 538
 At this point, we return briefly to consider a philosophical critique of this 539
approach – and indeed of the general evolution of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism, 540
as it was reviewed in section 1 above – offered by Susan Hurley (2002), who writes that 541
“Roemer’s account does not show how the aim to neutralize luck could provide a basis 542
for egalitarianism.”   Hurley says that, absent luck, many possible distributions of the 543
objective could have occurred, and one cannot claim that ‘neutralizing’ luck means to 544
render outcomes sensitive only to degrees of effort.    Moreover, she writes that it is not 545
an argument for EOp that it neutralizes the effects of luck. 546
The moral premise of the EOp view is that rewards should be sensitive only to the 547
autonomous efforts of individuals.  This is a special case of rewards according to deserts.  548
People deserve, in the EOp view, to acquire the objective in proportion to how hard they 549
try.   Thus, strictly speaking, the EOp view is not one whose fundamental primitive is 550
equality: deservingness is fundamental, together with the normative thesis that justified 551
inequality tracks deservingness.     Inequalities that are not due to unequal efforts are 552
defined as being due to luck: that is, luck is so-called because it is a cause of reward that 553
is illegitimate from the EOp view.  The statement that ‘EOp intends to neutralize the 554
effects of luck on outcomes’ is therefore equivalent to the statement ‘EOp intends to 555
render outcomes sensitive only to effort.’ 556
 So, for example, suppose a child, A, does well in life because his parents were 557
rich, not because he exerted great effort, while another child, B, from a poor family, does 558
well by virtue of exerting great effort.  Some might argue that it may be no less a matter 559
of luck that B was the kind of person who works hard than that A had rich parents, but 560
that approach, whatever its merits, is not the sense in which responsibility-concerned 561
egalitarians use the word luck.  Luck, for us,  means the source of non-effort caused 562
advantage.   To be sure, it is not an argument for EOp that it neutralizes luck, it is rather 563
definitive of the EOp view that it does so.  The argument for EOp must be that is right to 564
render outcomes sensitive only to effort13.     565
                                                
13 This point is due to Cohen (2006). 
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 The next example, which is hypothetical, is given to illustrate the difference 566
between the equal-opportunity approach and the approach that is conventional in many 567
areas of social policy, utilitarianism.    A utilitarian policy maximizes the average value 568
of the objective in a population.   Utilitarianism is a special case of welfarism, although 569
there are many welfarist preference orderings of policies.570
 We consider a population partitioned into T types, where the frequency of type t is 571
. The population suffers from I diseases, with the generic disease denoted i.  The 572
types might be defined by socio-economic characteristics14, and the Health Ministry is 573
interested in mitigating the affect of socio-economic characteristics on health.  There is 574
available in the health sector an amount of resource (money),   per capita.    We do not 575
address how much of a society’s product should be dedicated to health, but only how to 576
spend the amount that has been so dedicated. Effort is here conceived of as life-style 577
quality  (exercise, smoking behavior, etc.).   We choose the policy space to be allocations 578
of the resource to treating various diseases: that is vectors  which will be 579
constrained by a budget condition, where Ri   is the amount that will be spent to treat 580
each case of disease i, regardless of the characteristics of the person who has contracted 581
the disease.    Thus, by definition, we restrict ourselves to policies that are horizontally582
equitable: any person suffering from disease i, regardless of her type and life-style quality, 583
will receive the same treatment, because treatment expenditure is not a function of these 584
variables.  A more highly articulated policy space could allocate medical resources 585
predicated also on the type of patient and the life-style that patient had led. But in the 586
health sector, doing so would set the stage for antagonistic patient-provider relations, and 587
interfere with other values we hold, and so we choose to respect horizontal equity.  We 588
will return to this point below.589
 For any given vector R = (x1,..., xI )  there will ensue a distribution of life-style 590
quality in each type t, and a consequent distribution of disease occurrences in each type. 591
                                                
14 Of course, persons are surely in part responsible for their socio-economic 
circumstances.  But the Health Ministry’s mandate might be to eliminate health 
inequalities due those circumstances, and so formally, it would consider socio-economic 
aspects of households as circumstances.
f t
R
R = (R1,..., RI )
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Life-style quality may not be responsive to the policy, but we allow for the general case 592
in which it is.   Let us denote the fraction of individuals in type t who contract disease i593
when the policy is R  by . Then the policy is feasible when: 594
f t pit (R)xi R
i,t
595
and it exhausts the budget precisely when: 596
f t pit (R)xi = R
i,t
  (3.2) 597
The set of admissible policies comprises all those for which (3.2) holds: this is the set .     598
 We next suppose that we know the health production functions for each type; 599
these are functions that give the probability that a person of type t will contract disease i600
if she lives a life-style of quality q. Let i = 0  represent the case of ‘no disease’ being 601
contracted.  We denote these functions ; thus  is the probability that a t- type 602
will contract disease i if she lives life-style quality q.   We presume it is the case that 603
{ } are monotone decreasing functions: that is, raising life-style quality reduces the 604
probability of disease. 605
 We also have as data of the problem the mapping from the policy space  to the 606
space of cumulative distribution functions on the non-negative real numbers.  Denote that 607
class of distribution functions by .  The map 608
     609
gives us the distribution of life-style qualities that will occur in type t, at any policy R in 610
.     We write .   Thus an individual with life-style quality q in type t lies at 611
rank  of the effort distribution of her type, when the policy is R, if   We 612
denote this value of q by qR
t ( )  . 613
 Finally, we need to postulate the relationship between treatment of disease and 614
health outcome.  Let us take the outcome to be life expectancy.  We therefore suppose 615
that we know the life expectancy for those in type t who have contracted disease i  and 616
who are treated with the resource expenditure specified by R.  Denote this life expectancy 617
by it (R)  .  (Denote by 0t   the life expectancy of a person of type t who contracts no 618
pit (R)
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disease.)  We could further complexify, here, by assuming that life expectancy is a 619
function, in addition, of the life style quality of the individual, but choose not to do so. 620
 Consider, now, a policy R = (x1,..., xI )  , which induces a distribution of life-style 621
quality in each type.  Consider a type t and all those at rank  of t’s life-style quality 622
distribution.   Assume there is a large number of people in each type, so that the fraction 623
of people in a type who contract a disease is equal to the probability that people in that 624
type will contract the disease.  Then15 the average life expectancy of all such people – the 625
(t, )  cohort—will be626
s0t (qR




) it (R) Lt ( ,R) .627






Lt ( ,R)d   (3.3) 629
 Although we need a lot of data to compute the EOp policy, it is only the Ministry 630
of Health who must have these data: once the policy is computed, a hospital need only631
diagnose a patient to know what treatment is appropriate (i.e., how much to spend on the 632
case).  No patient need ever be asked her type or her life-style characteristics.  There is, 633
that is to say, no incursion of privacy necessitated by applying the policy—apart from the 634
initial incursion in the research survey on a population sample that assembles the data set 635
to compute the health production functions.  The policy is horizontally equitable.   This is 636
an important point, because some philosophers have falsely concluded that applying the 637
equal-opportunity approach will necessitate incursions into privacy, and making 638
distinctions among individuals in resource-allocation questions that are either difficult or 639
socially objectionable in some way (see Anderson (1999)).   But this is incorrect: the 640
planner can choose the policy space in a way that makes such distinctions irrelevant for 641
implementing the policy.  In other words, not only is the delineation of circumstances a 642
                                                
15 In the formula that follows, we have assumed for the sake of simplicity that an 
individual contracts either no or one disease.  Of course, the formula can be generalized 
to the case where we drop this assumption, as we do in the numerical example that 
follows.
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political/social decision that may vary across societies, but so must the specification of 643
the policy space take into consideration social views concerning privacy and fairness. 644
Let us make this example numerical. We posit a society with two types, the Rich 645
and the Poor.   The Poor have life-styles whose qualities q  are uniformly distributed on 646
the interval [0,1], while the Rich have life-style qualities that are uniformly distributed on 647
the interval [0.5, 1.5].  The probability of contracting cancer, as a function of life-style 648
quality (q) is the same for both types, and given by: 649
      650
Only the poor are at a risk of tuberculosis; their probability of contracting TB is: 651
     652
 Suppose that life expectancy for a rich individual is given by: 653
  70,      if cancer is not contracted, and  654
  ,  if cancer is contracted, and xc is spent on its treatment. 655
Thus, if the disease is contracted, life expectancy will lie between 50 and 70, depending 656
on how much is spent on treatment (from zero to an infinite amount).    This is a simple 657
way of modeling the fact that nobody dies of cancer before age 50. 658
 Suppose that life expectancy for a Poor individual is: 659
 70 if neither disease is contracted, 660
  if cancer is contracted and xc is spent on its treatment, and661
   if tuberculosis is contracted and   is spent on its treatment. 662
Thus, the Poor can die at age 30 if they contract TB and it is not treated.  With large 663
expenditures, a person who contracts TB can live to age 70.  Furthermore, it is expensive 664
to raise life expectancy above 30 if TB is contracted.  We further assume that if a Poor 665
person contracts both cancer and TB then her life expectancy will be the minimum of the 666
above two numbers. 667
 Finally, assume that 25% of the population is poor and 75% is rich, and that the 668
national health budget is R = $3000  per capita. 669



















 With these data, one can compute that 33% of the rich will contract cancer, 9.3% 670
of the poor will contract only cancer, 26% of the poor will contract only TB, and 56% of 671
the poor will contract both TB and cancer.  (Here, we do not exclude the possibility that a 672
person could contract both diseases.) 673
 Our policy is R = (xC , xTB )  , the schedule of how much will be spent on treating 674
an occurrence of each disease.  The objective is to equalize opportunities, for the Rich 675
and the Poor, for life expectancy. 676
 The life expectancy of a Rich person is given by: 677
LR( , xC ) =
2
3
( + .5)70 + (1 2
3
( + .5))(60 +10 xC 1
xC +1
) ,678
and of a Poor person by: 679
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 The solution of the program that maximizes the minimum life expectancy of the 681
two types, subject to the budget constraint,  is xC  = $686, xTB  =$13,027.  In figure 2, we 682
present the life expectancies of the Rich and the Poor, as a function of the rank at which 683
they sit on the effort (life-style) distribution of their type, at this solution.  The higher 684
curve is that of the Rich.  We see that, at the EOp solution, the Rich still have greater life 685
expectancy than the Poor – despite the large amounts being spent on treating 686
tuberculosis16.  The difference, however, is less one year. Moreover, life expectancy 687
increases with life-style quality – this inequality of outcome is an aspect that EOp does 688




                                                
16 We could further reduce the difference in the life expectancies of the two types if we 
were willing to predicate the expenditure policy on a person’s type, as well on her disease.
But we have opted for a policy space that respects the social norm of horizontal equity, 







Figure 2.   EOp policy: Life expectancy as a function of effort in two types, Rich and 698
Poor699
700
Let us compare this solution to the utilitarian solution, the expenditure schedule at which701
life expectancy in the population as a whole is maximized.  The solution turns out to be 702
xC = $1915, xTB = $10,571  .  Three times as much is spent on cancer as in the EOp 703
solution.   Figure 3 graphs the life expectancy of the two types in the utilitarian solution 704




Figure 3: Life expectancies of Rich and Poor,  utilitarian (dashed) and EOp (solid) 708
policies709
710
We see that the utilitarian solution narrows the life-expectancy differential between the 711
types less than does the EOp solution (although, in absolute terms, the differences are not 712
great).   The EOp solution is more egalitarian, across the types, than the utilitarian 713
solution – the utilitarian cares only about average life expectancy in aggregate, not on the 714
distribution of life expectancy across types. 715
 It is obvious that different objective functions will engender different optimal 716
solutions.  The unfortunate habit that is almost ubiquitous in policy circles is to identify 717
the utilitarian solution with the efficient solution.  Critics of the EOp solution will say that 718
it is inefficient because it delivers a lower life expectancy on average for the population 719
than the utilitarian solution.  But this is a confusion.  Both solutions are Pareto efficient, 720
in the sense that it is impossible, for either of them, to find a policy that weakly increases 721
the life expectancies of everyone.  Identifying the utilitarian social objective with 722
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efficiency is an unfortunate practice, rooted in the deep hold that utilitarianism has in 723
economics. Social efficiency is defined with respect to whatever the social objective is, 724
and there are many possible choices for that objective besides the social average.  We 725
discuss this point with respect to measuring economic development below in section 5. 726
727
4.  A more general approach 728
 Formula (3.1) gives an ordering on policies, with regard to the degree to which 729
they equalize opportunities, after the set of circumstances has been delineated.    It 730
implements the view that inequalities due to differential circumstances for those who 731
expend the same degree of effort are unacceptable.   There is, however, a conceptual 732
asymmetry: while the instruction to eliminate inequalities due to differential 733
circumstances is clear, the permission to allow differential outcomes due to differential 734
effort is imprecise.  How much reward does effort merit?   There is no obvious answer.735
To provide a social-welfare function (or a preference order over policies) that question 736
must be answered, at least implicitly.  In formula (3.1), the preference order is delineated 737
by stating that, if there is a society with just one type, then policies will be ordered 738
according to how large the average outcome is for that society.   Fleurbaey (2008) 739
therefore calls formula (3.1) a ‘utilitarian approach’ to equality of opportunity. 740
 What are the alternatives?   At a policy ,  the lower envelope of the 741
objective functions   is defined as: 742
    .  (4.1) 743
We wish to render the function  as ‘large’ as possible: formula (4.1) measures the ‘size’ 744
of  by taking its integral on [0,1].   More generally, let the set of non-negative, weakly 745
increasing functions on [0,1] be denoted ; we desire an ordering   on   which is 746
increasing, in the sense that if ( ) *( )  , then , with strict preference if 747
( ) > *( )  on a set of positive measure.   The integral of  , as in (4.1), provides such 748
an ordering.   But many other choices are possible.   For instance, consider the mapping 749
  given by    750
vt ( , )
( , ) = min
t







    for  .   (4.2) 751
Each of these provides an increasing order on .   As p becomes smaller, we implement 752
more aversion to inequalities that are due to effort.  As  approaches negative infinity, 753
the order becomes the maximin order, where no reward to effort is acceptable. 754
 We do not have a clear view about what the proper rewards to effort consist in, 755
and hence remain agnostic on the choice of ways to order the lower envelopes . 756
The problem of rewards-to-effort goes back to Aristotle, who advocated ‘proportionality,’ 757
a view that is incoherent, as it depends upon the units in which effort and outcomes are 758
measured.    Because we possess no theory of the proper rewards to effort, this is an open 759
aspect of the theory.    We believe that considerations outside the realm of equality of 760
opportunity must be brought to bear to decide upon how much inequality with respect to 761
differential effort is allowable.  For instance, G.A. Cohen (2009) has suggested that the 762
inequalities allowed by an equal-opportunity theory should, if they are large, be reduced 763
by appealing to the value of social unity (what he calls ‘community’), which will be 764
strained if outcome inequalities are too large. 765
 Our  agnostic view concerning the degree of reward that effort deserves contrasts 766
with that of Fleurbaey (2008), who advocates an axiom of ‘natural reward’ to calibrate 767
the rewards to effort, as will be discussed in section 5.768
 We can provide somewhat stronger foundations for the view that an equal-769
opportunity ordering of policies must maximize some increasing preference order on .  770
The first step is to note the importance of the lower envelope function : for the persons 771
who are most unfairly treated at a given policy are those, at each effort level, who 772
experience the lowest outcomes, across types.  (Hence, they are the ones represented on 773
the lower envelope.)   This is because the EOp view says outcomes with are different, due 774
to circumstances, for those who expend the same effort, are unfair.   The second step is to 775













A.  For any two policies   such that   there exists a set of positive measure 781
S such that   .     782
B. For any   such that   , either    or there is a set of 783
positive measure Y  such that    and a set of positive   784
measure  such that . 785
786
Part A of Axiom DOM states that if one policy is preferred to another, it must make some787
people who are the among the most unfairly treated better off than the other policy, and 788
Part B has a similar justification.   Thus DOM is a special case of what is sometimes 789
called the person-respecting principle  (see Temkin [1993]): that one social alternative is 790
better than another only if some people are better off in the first than in the second.791
 It is not hard to show that (see Roemer (2012)): 792
Proposition Let   be an order on satisfying DOM. Then is represented by an 793
increasing operator on .  Furthermore,  if is a continuous order, then  can be 794
chosen to be a continuous increasing operator.795
  Thus, with any continuous order on the lower-envelope functions  , we may 796
write the associated EOp program as: 797
        (GEOp) 798
for some increasing operator  .   The acronym GEOp stands for ‘generalized 799
equality of opportunity.’800
 We reiterate the main point of this section.   Because we possess no theory of 801
what comprise the just rewards to effort, we should not be dogmatic on the exact way to 802
order policies.    We have argued that an ordering of policies must come from an 803
increasing order on the set of lower-envelope functions , where the lower-envelope 804
function induced by a policy  is given by (4.1).   This ambiguity in the theory results in 805
program (GEOp), where the degree of freedom is the choice of the operator .  806
, ˆ  ˆ
S ( , ) > ( , ˆ )
, ˆ  ˆ ( , ) = ( , ˆ )
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Considerations outside of the theory of equal opportunity might put constraints on the 807
degree of overall inequality that is desirable/admissible in a society, and this can guide 808
the choice of .    809
 We have thus argued that the theory of equal opportunity is not intended as a 810
complete theory of distributive justice, for two reasons.   First, we have emphasized its 811
pragmatic nature.  We do not have a complete theory for what people are, indeed, 812
responsible, and have advocated the present approach as one that should viewed as 813
providing policy recommendations for societies that are consonant with the society’s 814
conception of responsibility.  Thus, the choice of the set of types, and even of the policy 815
space, will be dictated by social norms (we have illustrated the policy-space point with 816
the health-expenditure example).   Secondly, the theory does not include a view on what 817
the proper rewards to effort consist in, and this is reflected in the openness inherent in 818
program (GEOp).819
 Because we view the approach as most useful when the objective in question is 820
something measurable like income, or life expectancy, or wage-earning capacity, we shy 821
away from taking an all-encompassing objective of ‘utility.’   We view the usefulness of 822
the approach as one for policy makers, in particular ministries, who are concerned with 823
narrower objectives than overall utility: the health ministry has an objective of life 824
expectancy or infant survival, the education ministry has an objective of the secondary- 825
school graduation rate, the labor ministry is concerned with opportunities for the 826
formation of wage-earning capacity, or for employment, and so on.  All these objectives 827
are cardinally measurable, and it makes sense to use any of the operators defined in (4.2) 828
to generate an ordering on policies.829
 Nevertheless, we wish to remark that it is possible to apply the theory where the 830
objective is ‘utility,’ if utility is cardinally measurable.   (Actually, to use the operators in 831
(4.2) we require what is called cardinal measurability and ratio-scale comparability.)832
Because, when thinking about utility, we often conceive of effort as implying a disutility, 833
we now show why this is not a problem for the application.   Suppose utility functions 834
over consumption and labor expended are given by  where is the 835
individual’s wage rate.  The distribution function of  in type t is given by .    Let us 836
suppose we are considering the space of linear tax policies, where after-tax income is 837
u(x, L;w) w W
w F t
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given by  , where b is a lump-sum demogrant and  is the tax rate.   838
(It is implicitly assumed, since wage rates are fixed, that production is constant-returns-839
to-scale.)    Then the utility-maximizing individual chooses his labor supply optimally, 840
denoted by  , and of course,  budget-balance requires   841
where F is the population distribution of w.   Define  by  .   Then the 842
outcome functions are just the indirect utility functions: 843
   ,  844
and we are ready to calculate the EOp policy.    Here, ‘effort’ is interpreted not as one’s 845
labor supply, but rather as those actions which the person took that gave rise to his wage-846
earning capacity.    There are different distributions of wages in different types, reflecting 847
the differential circumstances that impinge upon wage-formation, but within each type, 848
there is a variation of the wage due to autonomous factors that we view as effort and 849
worthy of reward.850
851
5.  The Fleurbaey-Maniquet approach 852
 Marc Fleurbaey and Francois Maniquet have, in a series of writings, proposed a 853
number of proposals for ordering policies with respect to the degree to which they 854
equalize opportunities, which are similar in spirit to those discussed above, but different 855
in detail.   Their work is summarized in Fleurbaey (2008); the general inspiration of the 856
theory is the idea of envy-freeness, pioneered in the works of  Duncan Foley (1967) , 857
Serge-Christophe Kolm (1972), and  Hal Varian (1975).       Here, we present one of their 858
main proposals, which falls in the family of egalitarian-equivalent proposals, and as such, 859
descends from the work of Elisha Pazner and David Schmeidler (1978).  The approach is 860
substantially different from the one outlined in section 3, because it does not take the 861
viewpoint that equalizing opportunities involves maximizing the lower envelope function 862
 defined in (4.1). 863
 Suppose that a population is characterized by an outcome function   864
where c is a vector of circumstances  (characteristics of the individual or his environment 865
for which he is deemed not responsible), r is a vector of characteristics for which he is 866
deemed responsible, and  is a policy.   We will specialize to the case where  is the 867
(1 )wL+ b [0,1]
L( ,w) b = wL( ,w)dF(w)
wt ( ) F t (wt ( )) =
vt ( , ) = u((1 )wt ( )L(wt ( ), )+ b, L(wt ( ), ))
u(c,r, )
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distribution of some resource to the population: say, an allocation of money.    Let us 868
suppose, further, that there is some type  (i.e., vector of circumstances  ) that 869
characterizes the most disadvantaged type.   We desire to place an ordering on policies  870
that reflects the view that persons should not be held responsible for their circumstances, 871
but should be held responsible for the choice of r.872
 Fleurbaey (2008) represents the idea that persons should be held responsible for 873
their circumstances by various ‘principles of compensation;’ an example would be874
‘equal well-being for equal responsibility,’ meaning that if two individuals have the same 875
values of r, their outcomes should be the same  (i.e., independent of their circumstances).876
Thus the ordering of policies should reflect this desideratum.   He, Bossert (1995) and877
Maniquet also advocate various ‘principles of reward;’ for instance, if all individuals 878
have identical circumstances, then the resource should be divided equally among them, 879
called the ‘liberal reward principle’.    That is, if everyone is of the same type, there is no 880
justification for any compensatory policy.    It is clear from simple examples that it is, in 881
general, impossible to respect the liberal reward principle and the ‘equal well-being for 882
equal responsibility’ principle simultaneously as long as the environment is sufficiently 883
rich, and so Fleurbaey (2008) is a study of social-policy orderings that satisfy weaker 884
versions of postulates inspired by these principles. 885
 We summarize a prominent example of such an ordering.  Let  be given, and 886
construct another allocation of the resource,   – which need not be feasible, given the 887
budget – defined by: 888
     , 889
where i indicates the individual, and c*   is a reference set of circumstances – say, those 890
of the most disadvantaged type.   Thus, under  each individual receives an amount of 891
resource which makes her as well off as she is in the -allocation, but assuming, 892
counterfactually, that she had been a member of the reference type, and had maintained 893
the same values of the responsible factors.    In the counterfactual world in which  lives, 894
everybody is of the same type ( ) and so, no special compensation should be made to 895
individuals from the opportunity-equalizing viewpoint, according to the liberal rewared 896
c*
ˆ
u(ci ,ri , i ) = u(c






principle.   Hence, the ideal policy  is one in which the associated  is an equal897
distribution of the resource.    This tells us how to order actual policies :  we say that 898
  if the counterfactual distribution   is ‘more equal’ than  ; to be precise 899
       900
where   is the leximin ordering.      901
 This particular version of the egalitarian-equivalent approach to responsibility the 902
authors call zero egalitarian equivalence (ZEE), because the standardization takes place 903
by counterfactually making everyone a member of the worst-off type.  Of course, 904
standardizing with some other set of circumstances would do as well, although each 905
choice of how to standardize will (generally) produce a different ordering over policies.906
One virtue of this approach is that an ordinal outcome function u is all that is required, as 907
we only need to compare the outcome for individuals to variants of themselves  (where 908
they have different circumstances), which contrasts with the approaches discussed in 909
section 3, that require cardinality and even ratio-scale comparability.910
 Of course, the ZEE approach will in general give a different ordering of policies 911
than the GEOP approach;  Roemer (2012) calculates some examples.   Both approaches 912
are incomplete:  GEOP, as has been discussed, does not dictate a choice of the operator 913
 and ZEE does not dictate a choice of the way to standardize circumstances. 914
 An essential feature of the egalitarian-equivalent approach is the liberal reward 915
principle,  that if everyone were of the same type, then no redistribution is called for.916
To be specific, in the EOp approach, Roemer closes the model by saying that if everyone 917
is of the same type, then policies are preferred if they produce higher average outcomes, 918
while Fleurbaey and Maniquet say that policies are better in this case the closer they are 919
to equal-resources.   But, as we have argued in section 4, we remain agnostic on the right 920
way of closing the model, because we do not think the concept of equality of opportunity 921
contains a theory of just rewards to effort.   In particular, the liberal reward principle, 922
described above, will sometimes or often use use market institutions to close the model.923
Consider a problem where all persons have the same circumstances, but preferences 924
differ, due to voluntary choices.   The principle of liberal reward might be interpreted as 925









equilibrium following from an equal division of wealth.   But this means that the welfare 927
of individuals is determined by a particular set of institutions (markets with private 928
property).   Our objection, then, to the liberal reward principle is that in some cases there 929
is no obvious benchmark that can be considered ‘natural’  to define distribution in the 930
case where there is a unique set of circumstances.  This point harkens back to the legal 931
realists, who argued that there is no conception of laissez-faire that is free of ethical bias932
(see Fried [1998]) – or, to put it more starkly, the usual conception of laissez-faire is a 933
misnomer, as it presupposes property rights enforced by state power.934
 One disadvantage of the egalitarian-equivalent approach is that the notation does 935
not force the practitioner to come to grips with the fact that choices people make are 936
themselves influenced by circumstances.   Recall that in the EOp approach, it was the 937
degree of effort rather than the level of effort that was taken as reflecting responsibility, 938
and this distinction was made because the distribution of levels of effort is infected with 939
circumstances.   Now one can model the same idea in the ZEE approach, but the notation 940
does not invite doing so: there may be a tendency of practitioners to take r as observed941
levels of effort and choices of various kinds, and this would fail to take account of the 942
fact that the distribution of choices r in a type is itself a characteristic of the type, and 943
something that calls for compensation.    So a literal application of the ZEE model, which 944
is insensitive to this fact, will ascribe to persons responsibility for choices that are 945
perhaps heavily influence by circumstances, and should therefore call for compensation. 946
 One of the innovative applications of the egalitarian-equivalent approach by the 947
authors is to tax policy.    From among feasible tax policies, that policy should be chosen 948
which is most preferred according to the ZEE  preference order. As noted, this approach 949
provides a theory of optimal taxation that does not rely on any cardinalization of the 950
utility function.    Therefore,  Fleurbaey and Maniquet have produced a theory of optimal 951
taxation liberated from cardinal measurement of utility (that is, from maximizing the 952
integral of some social welfare function). See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) and 953
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011, chapter 11). 954
 Fleurbaey and Maniquet also propose a kind of dual to ZEE: namely, imagine a 955
counterfactual where all individuals expend the same reference level of effort, but 956
maintain their actual circumstances.  In this case, that allocation is most preferred which 957
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most closely equalizes outcomes  (that is, each person should be indifferent to how he 958
would feel if he had the circumstances of any other person).   The basis of this view is 959
that if persons all expend the same value of the responsible factors r, then there is no 960
ethical basis for their having different outcomes.   Again, this gives a preference order on 961
policies that can be defined without using cardinal utility functions, but using egalitarian 962
equivalence. The authors name this approach ‘conditional equality.’963
 One way to compare the approaches of Roemer and Fleurbaey-Maniquet is to ask: 964
Can the Fleurbaey-Maniquet preference orders be rationalized as instances of program 965
(GEOP), for some choice of ?   It turns out that the ZEE approach can be, but the 966
conditional equality approach cannot be.  See Roemer (2012) and Fleurbaey (2012).967
 Fleurbaey and Maniquet, in their work reported in Fleurbaey (2008), take an 968
axiomatic approach, proposing a number of axioms modeling the ideas that persons 969
should be held responsible for their autonomous actions but not for their circumstances.970
Strong versions of these axioms produce impossibility results, as we noted.    (This is 971
immediately clear if one thinks of the EOp model discussed in section 3.  There will 972
almost never exist a policy that uses all the budget available and equalizes for all , the 973
outcomes across all types.  This would be the summum bonum, from the viewpoint of 974
equality of opportunity, but it cannot be achieved in a problem of any complexity. So 975
some compromise is called for.)  Their approach is to sequentially weaken axioms until 976
they find possible preference orders over policies.    A significant part of their analysis 977
therefore consists in providing axiomatizations of different preference orders over 978
policies, each of which has some purchase as reflecting the equal-opportunity view.  The 979
egalitarian-equivalent and conditional-equality families turn out to be the important ones. 980
 Before concluding this section, we mention another preference ordering of 981
policies similar in spirit to the EOp ordering, first proposed by Van de gaer (1993): order 982
policies according to the value of 983
      (5.1) 984
In other words, maximize the average outcome value of the most disadvantaged type.985
Formally, this proposal simply commutes the integral and ‘min’ operators compared to 986
Roemer’s approach in (3.1).    Its virtue is that it is sometimes easier to compute than 987
min
t




(3.1).  If there is an unambiguously worst off type  (that is a type t such that for all 988
policies  and for all types , and all   we have ), then (3.1) 989
and (5.1) are equivalent.  Unfortunately, (5.1) is not a special case of (GEOP);  it does not 990
necessarily maximize the size of the lower-envelope function , for any conception of 991
how to measure size  (i.e.,  ).  See Roemer (2012).   Ooghe, Schokkaert and Van de 992
gaer (2007) compare the orderings over social policies induced by (5.1) and (3.1) by 993
introducing a number of axioms that distinguish between the two.   They argue that 994
Roemer’s approach (3.1) is a ‘compensating outcomes’ approach, while Van de gaer’s 995
(4.3) is an ‘equalizing opportunity sets’ approach, in the sense that the integral 996
  can be viewed as a measure of the degree of opportunity available to type t.997
Therefore, these authors link their approach to the large literature on equalizing 998
opportunity sets (e.g., Bossert (1997), Foster (2011)) which derived its inspiration from 999
Sen’s capability approach. 1000
 Our final topic of this section is the attempt to incorporate luck into the theory of 1001
equal opportunity.  Of course, luck has already to some extent been incorporated, as 1002
circumstances are viewed as aspects of luck  -- for example, the luck of birth lottery 1003
assigns genes, families, and social environments.  Besides the luck inherent in 1004
circumstances, however, there are two other kinds of luck that are important: first, what 1005
might be called episodic luck, which is randomly distributed across individuals, and is 1006
often unobservable to third parties  (being in the right place at the right time), and the 1007
luck due to the outcome of gambles.   Dworkin’s view was that no compensation is due to 1008
anyone who suffers a bad outcome due to a voluntarily taken gamble – such ‘option luck’ 1009
is due to an exercise of preferences for which the person is held responsible.  Fleurbaey 1010
(2008), however, contests this view.  He splits gambles into two parts: the decision to 1011
take the gamble, which is the person’s responsibility, and the outcome of the gamble, 1012
which is an aspect of luck.  Let us view the risk-taking preference of the individual as a 1013
responsibility characteristic, and the outcome of the gamble as a circumstance – 1014
something over which the individual has no control.  Fleurbaey proposes giving all 1015
persons with a given risk-taking propensity (i.e., responsibility characteristic) the average 1016
value of all gambles that such persons take.    Thus, everyone with the same 1017
t [0,1] vt ( , ) vt ( , )




responsibility characteristic receives the same outcome.  Of course, the informational 1018
requirements for implementing such a plan are severe.  As well, it seems to countervene 1019
the purpose of gambling.  If gamblers wanted to protect themselves from bad outcomes, 1020
they would insure to receive the expected value of the gamble.    If, however, gamblers 1021
are risk-loving, then they would only insure to receive something more than the gamble’s 1022
expected value, and such insurance is not fiscally feasible.    So in offering gamblers the 1023
expected value of all gambles taken by their risk-type, their welfare is being reduced 1024
from actual gambling, assuming that they are risk lovers. This solution, first advocated by 1025
Le Grand (1991), has other weaknesses. The different lotteries offered to the individual 1026
decision makers can be ranked unambiguously from the most profitable to the least one if 1027
Fleurbaey’s solution is implemented. Indeed, the lotteries would only differ in terms of 1028
the average outcome since all risk is eliminated.  All rational decision makers (who prefer 1029
more than less) will choose the same lottery. Full equality will be then observed ex post. 1030
Fleurbaey’s solution then leads fully to eliminate the impact of option luck.1031
 Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2009)  believe that the project of separating 1032
influences into circumstances and effort is too binary.   They call ‘residual luck’ a third 1033
influence, and recommend something weaker than compensation for residual luck, 1034
namely, that the correlation between such luck and circumstances be eliminated.1035
Consider the following examples: some people gain by the chance meeting of another 1036
person;  popular views do maintain that persons with rare productive talent be specially 1037
compensated;  the winnings of national lotteries (Belgium, France, UK)  are often not 1038
taxed.  The luck inherent in these examples (especially the first two) is often considered 1039
to be part of life, something that policy should not eliminate.   The first example could be 1040
brute luck or due to special effort; the second example is brute luck; the third is option 1041
luck.   These authors maintain that these kinds of luck should be equally distributed 1042
across types, at any given level of effort.1043
 Suppose the income-generating process is given by: 1044
y = g(c,e,l)1045
where c, e, and l are circumstances, effort, and residual luck, respectively.  The 1046
distribution of income, conditional upon c and e is defined as: 1047
H (y | c,e) = Fc,e(g
1(y,c,e))1048
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where Fc,e   is the distribution of luck in the element of the population characterized by 1049
(c,e)  .   The above-described principle says that1050
  for any (c,c ) H ( | c,e) = H ( | c ,e) = K( | e)  . 1051
This allows the distribution of virtual luck to depend on effort but not on circumstances.1052
If all luck factors are named as circumstances, then the distribution K is simply a point 1053
mass.  The authors propose further refinements using stochastic-dominance arguments. 1054
1055
6. Economic development 1056
 The standard measure of economic development, GDP per capita, is inspired by 1057
the utilitarian ethic.   If we identify utility with income, then average utilitarianism calls 1058
for maximizing average income.  Hence this conception of economic development is a 1059
corollary to an ethical view.  As utilitarianism was ubiquitous in economic thinking until 1060
Rawls (1971), and continues to be extremely influential in economics after Rawls, 1061
especially in growth theory and policy analysis, it is unsurprising that our central measure 1062
of economic development has a basis in utilitarian thought.1063
 There are various ways we might alter our measurement of economic 1064
development, based on other ethical views.   Indeed, some alterations can be made within 1065
utilitarianism.  By recognizing that some needs are more urgent than others, we could 1066
apply a concave transformation to income, say the logarithm, and measure economic 1067
development by log xi , where   is income, which is ordinally equivalent to 1068
maximizing xi  .   Of course, this would place much more policy focus upon avoiding 1069
poverty, as a single income of zero is socially catastrophic.   Another approach, still 1070
within utilitarianism, is to include other arguments besides income in the utility function 1071
– education, health, etc. – but to take the average of an index of these goods over the 1072
nation.  This is the approach of the UNDP’s human development index.   But if 1073
equalizing opportunities is an attractive ethic, then we should construct measures of 1074
economic development that are consonant with it.   This section begins that discussion. 1075
 As a preliminary consideration, we must clear the deck of an opposing position 1076
which argues that economic development is a technical concept, not one related to social 1077
welfare.  This cannot be correct.  Economics is not engineering: its goal is to maximize 1078
xi
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social welfare, however that be conceived.    Even for those who abjure the possibility of 1079
interpersonal comparisons, Pareto efficiency is a conception of social welfare.   An 1080
economy consisting of slaves who produce, for a very small elite, huge wealth, should 1081
not be considered highly developed, no matter how refined the technology.   Economic 1082
development must mean the development of human beings  (some would include other 1083
sentient beings), and how to conceive of it must be corollary to a theory of the good life 1084
and good society.1085
 If equality of opportunity is to replace utilitarianism as the ethical view of choice, 1086
then we must replace GDP per capita with some measure of opportunity equality as a 1087
measure of economic development.    We will propose, here, a two-dimensional index of 1088
economic development, based upon the EOp approach.  The first component of the index 1089
is the value of  (3.1), and the second is a measure of the extent to which inequality in the 1090
society is due to inequality of opportunity (as opposed to differential effort)17.1091
 There are various methods for defining the second component; here is one.  1092
Suppose H is the distribution of income in the society, let   be the income distribution 1093
in type t, and let   be the frequency of type t.  Then    .   Let ( resp., t )1094
be the mean of H (resp., H t )  .   Define the square of the coefficient of variation of H by: 1095
     . 1096
Define the distribution: 1097
  ,   (6.1) 1098
where  and .  Clearly the mean of  is .  If  were the 1099
actual distribution of the objective in society, then everybody in a given type would have 1100
exactly the same value of income, equal to the mean income of that type.   (The 1101
distribution function  is a step function with the same mean as H. ) Were this the case, 1102
then the contribution of effort to inequality would be nil, as no variation of the objective1103
                                                
17 For instance, take income as the objective, and define a typology by parental education 
levels.
H t
f t H = f t H t
C(H ) = var H2
T (x) = f t
t=0
k
 on the interval k x k+1




would exist within any type.    Now it is well-known  that we can decompose  as 1104
follows:1105
   ,   (6.2) 1106
where   .   Since both addends in this decomposition are positive, it is natural to 1107
interpret  as a lower bound of the amount of inequality due to circumstances, and 1108
 as an upper bound on the amount of inequality due to effort.    We 1109





 . (6.3) 1112
The reason that the measure   is only an upper bound on the fraction of inequality due 1113
to effort is that circumstances continue to influence the second term in the decomposition 1114
(6.2).    See Shorrocks (1980) for a characterization of all inequality indices that can be 1115
decomposed in the sense of (6.2). 1116
 Our proposal is to measure economic development by the ordered pair 1117
.   replaces GDP per capita: it is the average income of those who 1118
belong to the most disadvantaged type18.   Thus, d presents both a level of welfare and a 1119
degree of inequality. 1120
 The proposal to measure the degree of equality of opportunity using the 1121
decomposition (6.2) is not original with us.  It is a special case of the ‘inequality of 1122
opportunity ratio (IOR)’ defined in Ferreira and Gignoux (2011).  Ferreira and Gignoux’s 1123
preferred measure of inequality is not the square of the coefficient of variation but the 1124
‘mean logarithmic deviation.’  The same idea for measuring the degree of inequality due 1125
to circumstances is proposed in Checchi and Peragine (2010) as well.1126
                                                
18 Or, more generally, as we explained above, it is the average value of the objective of 
those in the population who comprise the left-hand envelope of the type distributions of 
the objective.  Frequently, the left-hand envelope of the type-income-cdfs is the cdf of a 
single type. 
C(H )
C(H ) = C( T ) + f t ( t )2C(H t )
t = t
C( T )
f t ( t )2C(H t )
d = (W EO , ) W EO
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In figure 4, we present a graph plotting the points d for a set of European 1127
countries, where the are taken from EU-SILC (2005) and the population of male workers 1128
is partitioned into three types, depending on the level of education of the more educated 1129
parent.  (Type 1: Parent completed only lower secondary; type 2: parent completed upper 1130




Figure 4.  The points  for a set of European countries 1135
1136
Several remarks are in order.   (1) Generally, over 80% of the inequality in income is due 1137
to ‘effort,’ but recall our typology is very coarse: there is only one circumstance, parental 1138
education, partitioned into three levels.  A finer decomposition of the population into 1139
more types would lower the degree of inequality due to effort.  (2)  Iceland’s (IS) strong 1140
position on the first component, it must be remembered, is from data before the bank 1141
crisis.  (3)  No country dominates all others on both components of d.  But Denmark 1142
(DK) dominates all other countries except Luxemburg (LU) and Iceland.  (4) Greece’s 1143
component  is not credible, and may be due to poor data.  (5) The Eastern European 1144
d = (W EO , )
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countries (Lithuania, Lativa, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary) perform 1145
relatively poorly.  Finally, recall that we are looking at highly developed countries; were 1146
we to calculate the point d for developing countries, there would be a much larger spread.1147
(For further details on this calculation, see Roemer [2013].)1148
  Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) calculate their version of the measure  for six 1149
Latin American countries as well. Their calculation differs from the one presented here 1150
using the SILC data in two ways: they have a different set of circumstances, and they use 1151
a different measure of inequality.    There is, as one might expect, a lower degree of 1152
opportunity equalization in the Latin American countries than in the European ones. 1153
 There is one study, of Sweden, in which the population of male workers was 1154
decomposed into 1152 types, based upon the observation of seven circumstances 1155
(Björklund, Jäntti, and Roemer [2012]).  These authors use a Shapley-value method to 1156
assign the degree of income inequality due to the various circumstances and to effort. For 1157
the coefficient-of-variation-squared measure, the fraction of long-run income inequality 1158
due to effort is calculated to be between 59 and 80 percent, considerably lower than the 1159
96% shown in figure 4.    It is a testament to the degree of equality of opportunity in 1160
Sweden that, with such a fine decomposition of the working population into types,  (only) 1161
between 20 and 40 percent of income inequality is due to circumstances.1162
 One disadvantage of reporting the level of economic development as a two- 1163
dimensional statistic is complexity; in particular, this generates only a partial ordering of 1164
countries with respect to the degree of development.  One could create a single index by 1165
aggregating as follows: 1166
        (6.4) 1167
for some  . The advantage of the Cobb-Douglas aggregation is that the ordering 1168
it imposes on countries is independent of the units in which W and are measured, so it 1169
does not matter that W is a large number and   is a small one.    For the European 1170
countries in figure 4, most values of in (0,1) render a country-ordering which is very 1171
highly correlated with the ordering of the first component.   We conjecture that this 1172
would not occur with a larger set of countries, in which the variation of  would be more 1173
substantial.1174
d̂ = (W EO ) 1
(0,1)
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 The World Bank has been an important innovator in bringing considerations of 1175
equal opportunity into economic development.  Its two important publications, to date, 1176
have been the 2006 World Development Report, Equity and Development, and a 1177
monograph, Measuring inequality of opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean1178
(Paes de Barros et al., 2009).   The more recent publication contains a wealth of 1179
information on the effects of social circumstances on various measures of achievement 1180
and output.1181
 Paes de Barros et al. (2009) propose a measure of equality of opportunity.  1182
Consider a particular kind of opportunity, such as ‘attaining the sixth grade in elementary 1183
school.’   Let the total sixth-grade attendance in a country be H, and the total number of 1184
children of sixth-grade age be N, and define  to be the access on average of 1185
children to the opportunity of a sixth-grade education.    measures the level of this 1186
opportunity in the country, but not the extent to which access is unequal to different 1187
children, based upon their social circumstances.   Now using a logit model, they estimate 1188
the probability that each child, j, in the country has of attending the sixth grade, where 1189
that probability is a function of a vector of circumstances; denote this estimated 1190
probability by .  Define .    D measures the variation in access to 1191
the opportunity in question across children in the country.  The normalization guarantees 1192
that .    Now define the human opportunity index as 1193
   ; 1194
note that . 1195
 The human opportunity index is a non-consequentialist measure of development, 1196
because the probabilities  can only be computed knowing the circumstances of the 1197
children.  The measure combines a concern with the level of provision of opportunities 1198
and the inequality of the distribution of them.  This is to be contrasted with the ordered 1199
pair (Ŵ EO , ) , which separates these two concerns into two measures.   Obviously, some 1200
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 The concern of the 2009 report is in large part with children.  In our view, where 1202
children are concerned, all inequality should be counted as due to circumstances, and 1203
none to effort, and so the fact that the human opportunity index does not explicitly make 1204
the distinction between effort and circumstances is unobjectionable19.    However, if the 1205
measure is used for addressing inequality of opportunity for adults, this may be a defect.  1206
To study this, let us take an opportunity for adults – earning an income above M.1207
Suppose there are three types of worker, according to the level of education of their more 1208
educated parent.  Denote the distribution of income in type t as ; let the fraction of 1209
type t be and let F be the distribution of income in the society as a whole.  Then 1210
 is the average access to the opportunity in question in the country.    Now 1211
for all members j of a given type, t, compute that : this is because the 1212
probabilities  are computed by taking the independent variables in the logit regression 1213
as the circumstances.   Hence, the human opportunity measure is:1214
 . (6.5) 1215
Despite the fact that effort is not explicitly mentioned in defining the index, effort is 1216
reflected in measure, because the distributions  appear in the calculation.   Indeed, the 1217
first term  measures the level of opportunity in the country, while the second 1218
term is a penalty for the degree to which this opportunity is mal-distributed with respect 1219
to circumstances  (e.g., if there were no inequality of opportunity, then 1220
for all t, and the penalty is zero).1221
 In expression (6.5), the first term on the right-hand side, 1 F(M )  , plays the role 1222
that Ŵ EO  plays in the ordered-pair measure we introduced above: it measures the level of 1223
development.  But while Ŵ EO  focuses upon how well off the most disadvantaged type is 1224
doing, 1 F(M )  is a level for the society at large.  The second component of our 1225
                                                
19 Children should only become responsible for their actions after an ‘age of consent’ is 
reached, which may vary across societies.  Both nature and nurture fall within the ambit 
of circumstances for the child. 
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measure, , is explicitly derived to show the degree to which inequality is due to 1226
circumstances, while the second term on the right-hand side of (6.5) is a form of a 1227
variance.   Certainly these two measures are getting at the same phenomenon.   We have 1228
a slight preference for our proposal, as it is more carefully justified as measuring what we 1229
are concerned with.    But these are minor differences; certainly, the measure O is in the 1230
spirit of thinking of economic development as opportunity equalization. 1231
 We finally consider a confusion (from our viewpoint) that infects discussions of 1232
‘equity versus development,’ similar to the one we mentioned at  when we presented the 1233
health-expenditure example.   It is often said that equity and efficiency are competing 1234
goals, that equity is purchased at the expense of efficiency.    There are two senses in 1235
which this phrase is uttered.    The first is that redistributive taxation may be purchased 1236
only at the cost of Pareto inefficiency, due to workers’ and firms’ facing different 1237
effective wages.  This is true.  The second sense is that redistribution may lower total 1238
output.    These two claims are in principle independent.    There may be policies which 1239
re-allocate income in a more equitable manner, lower total output, but are not Pareto 1240
inefficient.  (Think, for example, of re-allocating educational funds from tertiary 1241
education to secondary education in a poor country.  This might have a purely 1242
redistributive effect, without significant consequences for Pareto efficiency.)1243
 We wish to criticize the second usage of the phrase.   Saying that there may be a 1244
trade-off between equity and efficiency where efficiency is measured as total output is 1245
equivalent to saying there is a trade-off between equity and the utilitarian measure of 1246
development, which (in its simplest form) is given by output per person.  Consider the 1247
following quotations from the otherwise fine report of the World Development Report1248
2006, issued by the World Bank,   entitled Equity and Development.  In these quotations, 1249
equity and development are counter-posed: 1250
 Greater equity is thus doubly good for poverty reduction: through potential 1251
beneficial effects on aggregate long-run development and through greater 1252
opportunities for poorer groups within any society (p.2) 1253
1254
If the opportunities faced by children like N. are so much more limited than those 1255
faced by children like P. or S., and if this hurts development progress in the 1256




Third, the dichotomy between policies for growth and policies specifically aimed at 1260
equity is false (p.10) 1261
1262
In the first quotation, saying that equity is ‘doubly good,’ in that it is good for the poor 1263
and also good for long-run development, only makes sense if one assumes that equity and 1264
long-run development are different goals.   In our view, long-run development means1265
approaching equity – that is, equality of opportunity.    We believe that the authors of this 1266
sentence had in mind GDP per capita as the measure of long-run development, and so 1267
what is being said is that equalizing opportunities will increase GDP per capita.   This is 1268
peculiar in a report that is devoted to advocating the view that economic development 1269
requires the achievement of equal opportunity20.    In the second quotation, the 1270
assumption is that redressing the inequality of opportunity among the children is 1271
justifiable because that inequality hurts development: but in our view, it is that inequality 1272
which comprises underdevelopment, and so the sentence is tautological.  Here, the 1273
authors have in mind a utilitarian concept as the measure of economic development.1274
Finally, the third quotation would likewise be a tautology for us: but in the context, the 1275
authors are saying that policies which increase equality of opportunity also lead to an 1276
increase in total income.   (That is, the third quotation is offered as an empirical claim, 1277
while for us, it is a tautology.)    Again, there is an ambivalence in the conceptualization 1278
of economic development: does it mean equalizing opportunities, or increasing per capita 1279
output?1280
 It will often be the case that policies that redress inequality of opportunity will 1281
also increase total output, because improving opportunities for the disadvantaged1282
releases talents that were, before, unused.  But this need not be the case, and we maintain 1283
that our justification for redressing inequality of opportunity should not depend on its 1284
being the case.    There may be groups in society that are so disadvantaged that it is very 1285
costly to compensate them:  the return in output per funds invested may be small.  Equity 1286
                                                
20 To say that development ‘requires’ equalizing opportunities is weaker than saying that 
it is synonymous with equalizing opportunities: we have been advocating the latter 
position in this section. 
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may be advanced only by shifting investment from uses where it generates high output to 1287
ones where it generates lower output. (This may be so, particularly in the short-run.)  But 1288
if this is the case, it does not mean that the policy in question should not be undertaken, 1289
nor does it mean that development is thereby reduced if it is.   1290
 The ambivalence in Equity and Development is a reflection of the competing 1291
conceptions of justice represented by utilitarianism and opportunity-equalization.1292
Utilitarianism, as we said, has a strong hold on economists.    This is a hold-over from an 1293
earlier period when utilitarianism was the only game in town – let us say, until John 1294
Rawls’s work (1958, 1971).  Economists and mathematicians developed optimization 1295
techniques (e.g., the Bellman equation) which are suited to solving problems where 1296
utilities are added up across persons, but not to solving problems where the minimum is 1297
maximized.   And so it is often comfortable to work with utilitarian formulations.    We 1298
submit, however, that this is a bad habit that we should not continue to practice. 1299
 If our view of economic development is adopted, there may be a significant 1300
change in policy evaluation.   One would not have to justify investment in very 1301
disadvantaged social groups by showing that such investment increases total output.  As 1302
we indicated, in the long run, such a conflict might not exist: but often, policy makers are 1303
under political pressure to evaluate the consequences of their policy choices in the short 1304
run.  If a country is evaluated on the basis of its ordered-pair statistic d = rather 1305
than on GDP per capita, policies could be quite different. 1306
1307
7.  Dynamics 1308
 Equality of opportunity invites a dynamic approach.  If we apply an EOp policy 1309
today, what effect will it have on the distribution of types in the next generation?  One 1310
hopes that sequential application of EOp policies would create a society where most of 1311
the effect on inequality from circumstances has been eliminated.    A natural way to study 1312
this question is to analyze stationary states: that is policies which have the property that 1313
the society they produce at date   is a replica of the society that existed at date  .    1314
 We know of only paper on this topic, by Roemer and Ünveren (2012), which 1315
presents an extended example.  In the society postulated, there are two economic classes, 1316
rich (R) and poor (P), whose pre-tax  (inelasticallly produced) incomes are  and ,1317




.  Both the family and state invest in children.  Let private investment in its child 1318
by a type J family be  and state investment in a J child be , for .   At a 1319
point in time, the fraction of R(P) households is .  Mean income at this 1320
time is = fRwR + fPwP .  The state investments are funded by a linear income tax at 1321
some rate t; thus  1322
  .  (7.1) 1323
Let  be the total monetary investment in a J child, .   The 1324
probability of the child’s being successful, in the sense of becoming an R adult, is a 1325
function of his background.  For a child growing up in an R household, it is 1326
   ,   (7.2a) 1327
while the probability of transition to the R class for a child from a P background is: 1328
 (7.2b)
1329
The fact that   models the idea that the cultural effects of growing up in a P1330
household (and neighborhood) reduce the chances of becoming an R adult. The 1331
formulation of the transition probabilities is a reduced-form representation of a process of 1332
competition for the ‘good’ jobs among young workers. 1333
 The standard of living of a J adult is his after-tax income, which is 1334
. The utility of an adult is a function of his income and the expected 1335
income of his child when she becomes an adult; we may write the utility of a J adult at 1336
date  as 1337
UJ = yJ + ( J yR
+1 + (1 J )yP
+1)     .           (7.3) 1338
 A stationary state is a stable set of policies and decisions.  It comprises a policy 1339
, optimal private-investment choices by households, , and a stable 1340
fraction of rich households , such that the following hold: 1341
(1) , 1342
(2)  maximizes (over i)1343
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Condition (1) is the budget constraint, and condition (4) says that the fraction of R1348
households is stable; condition (2) defines the optimal investment choice of an R parent, 1349
knowing that the next period will look exactly like the present period from the viewpoint 1350




An environment is summarized by the data  with the intergenerational 1355
transmission functions ( R , P ) .   For this environment, there will exist a set of stationary 1356
states.  We are interested in the stationary state that is best from the equal-opportunity 1357
viewpoint.    We define this as follows.  In a stationary state, the expected standard of 1358
living of a J child is: 1359
EJ = J ((1 t)wR iR )+ (1 J )((1 t)wP iP ) .1360
The equality-of-opportunity ethic maintains we should maximize the expected standard 1361
of living of the worse-off type of type of child.  Thus, if  and  denote two stationary 1362
states, then EOp weakly prefers  to  if: 1363
   .     (7.4) 1364
 Obviously, the ordering on stationary states defined by (7.4) induces an ordering 1365
on policies.  We wish to compute the most desirable state policy according to the 1366
preference order (7.4). 1367
 Solving for the optimal stationary state is complicated, because the optimization 1368
program is non-convex due to the incentive-compatibility constraints.  The authors 1369
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compute optimal policies for a randomly generated set of economies by analysis and1370
simulation.  The striking result is that, in 76% of the economies randomly generated, the 1371
optimal stationary state from the EOp viewpoint is laissez-faire: that is, the state should 1372
neither tax nor invest in children.  The reason is that if the state invests in Poor children, 1373
Rich families compensate by investing more in their children.1374
 Admittedly, this is just an example. The authors then consider a second type of 1375
policy: investment in parents.  Formally, this is modeled by devoting state investment to 1376
raise the coefficient a  (see eqn. (7.2b)), which reduces the handicap that Poor children 1377
face due to their background.  Now, in the simulations, in 80% of the cases, the state 1378
invests in parents (that is, in increasing a), but not in children.1379
 These results are mindful of the work of James Heckman (2011), who has been 1380
championing the importance of early childhood education.  It appears that much of the 1381
disadvantage of being poor has already occurred by the age of three or four.    We suggest, 1382
based on these results, that investment in Poor families may be more productive, in the 1383
long run, than investing directly in children.1384
 A second approach to incentive issues in equality of opportunity is the work of 1385
Calsamiglia (2009), who points out that if there are several ministries attempting to 1386
equalize opportunities for different objectives, each taking a ‘local’ approach, the 1387
consequence may be to not equalize opportunities globally.   Her paper characterizes the 1388
types of local EOp policies that will induce global equality of opportunity. 1389
 Suppose that Paul and Richard have identical preferences and skills; both want to 1390
play professional basketball, and to attend college.   They face the same basketball 1391
resources in their two neighborhoods, but Richard’s (rich) neighborhood has better 1392
schools. So Richard is advantaged with respect to the probability of college admission 1393
due to a fortunate circumstance.    Their probabilities of being admitted to college and a 1394
professional basketball team will depend upon their efforts in school and in basketball 1395
respectively, and on the resources in their neighborhoods21.  Suppose initially that both 1396
pro-basketball and college recruiters adopt a ‘market’ policy : they admit candidates 1397
                                                
21 We ignore American colleges’ propensity to admit star basketball players, regardless of 
their academic accomplishment. 
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based only on their scores on relevant tests, which are functions of effort and 1398
circumstances in the relevant arena.   Facing these policies, Paul and Richard choose 1399
basketball and school effort   to maximize the total probability of admission to the 1400
basketball league and college, minus some convex cost in total effort.    Since school 1401
effort is relatively less effective for Paul, he devotes less effort to school than Richard 1402
and more effort to basketball.  It turns out that Richard has a higher utility, although the 1403
two boys have identical preferences and skills. 1404
 Now the basketball league and college alter their policies, in an attempt to 1405
equalize opportunities.    Suppose that the league’s policy is to admit players based only 1406
on their efforts pertaining to basketball: then if Paul and Richard expend the same 1407
basketball effort,  , they will enjoy the same probability of recruitment by the league, 1408
which is locally fair, because they have the same basketball circumstances.  Suppose that 1409
the college admissions officer decides to give extra points on his college-admission score 1410
to Paul as compensation for Richard’s advantaged circumstances: he simply adds a 1411
lumpsum to Paul’s SAT score.  This is also a local EOp policy.    Given these two 1412
policies, Paul and Richard will not alter their efforts, because of the lump-sum nature of 1413
the compensation to Paul, and hence Paul and Richard will have the same probability of 1414
college admission  (locally EOp), but Paul has a higher probability of getting into the 1415
basketball league, as he expended more basketball effort.  Although the policies are each 1416
locally EOp, the global result is not opportunity equalizing. 1417
 The problem lies with the lump-sum nature of the EOp policy in the college sector.  1418
Calsamiglia proves that, under assumptions that the environment is sufficiently rich, the 1419
necessary and sufficient condition for local EOp policies to aggregate to a global policy 1420
that is opportunity-equalizing is that the marginal returns to effort must be identical for 1421
all candidates in each sector.   Because Paul’s effort in school is less remunerative than 1422
Richard’s, due to his inferior school, the proper policy is to augment the returns per unit 1423
of school effort for Paul in terms of the desired outcome (probability of college 1424
admission).1425
 Certainly, many affirmative action policies are of the wrong, lump-sum type.  For 1426




backgrounds, in considering admissions.  The empirical implications of Calsamiglia’s 1428
result have yet to be examined.1429
1430
8.  Preparing the ground for empirical analysis 1431
            The literature on distributive justice is divided into two strands, a large normative 1432
one and a small descriptive one. The previous sections have considered the normative 1433
foundations of equality of opportunity. This section and the next review the empirical 1434
evidence showing that in many societies, ordinary people distinguish between two causes 1435
of inequality: those for which individuals should not held responsible, and those for 1436
which they should be. If people do make this distinction when discussing inequality, then 1437
implementing opportunity-equalizing policies may be politically more feasible than 1438
otherwise.  The issue of social acceptance of the principle is even more important if one 1439
follows Roemer’s (1993) view according to which the cut between circumstances and 1440
effort should be a social and cultural decision, rather than a metaphysical one.  Each 1441
society should determine the precise set of variables that describe the circumstances and 1442
the effort variables according to the views of its population. Intercultural differences in 1443
social preferences will obtain in this pragmatic view of equality of opportunity. Empirical 1444
work on intercultural differences in the attribution of the responsibility is then relevant. 1445
The state of our knowledge on these matters is still weak.  Below, we list the most 1446
obvious candidates for an empirical assessment.1447
 The first issue concerns the so-called ‘responsibility cut.’ In the philosophical 1448
literature, there is a debate between those who advocate that people should be responsible 1449
for their preferences ( for example, Dworkin (1981a, 1981b) and  Fleurbaey (2008)) and 1450
those who argue that the responsibility variables should be those under the control of the 1451
individual (prominently,  Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1989) ).1452
 The second issue concerns the correlation between effort and circumstances. Life-1453
style choices (patterns of alcohol use, exercise, smoking, diet and so on) are examples of1454
variables under proximate personal control. These choices are, however, influenced by 1455
family and social background. As we have said, for the measure of effort to be 1456
appropriate for the theory, it must be sterilized of the impact of circumstances upon it.1457
"If we could somehow disembody individuals from their circumstances, then the 1458
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distribution of the propensity to exert effort would be the same in every type” wrote 1459
Roemer (1998).   As we wrote earlier, Roemer’s technique for sterilizing effort of the 1460
effect of circumstances upon it is to measure the degree of a person’s effort by her rank 1461
on the distribution of effort of those in her type. The same issue arises with preferences:1462
if a large number of persons in a given type have preferences which, let us say, degrade 1463
the value of education, one must recognize that educational choices of such persons are 1464
influenced by their circumstances, and are not autonomous in the appropriate sense.1465
Dworkin’s (1981b) opposition to this move is to claim that not holding persons 1466
responsible for their preferences is to disrespect them.  Another philosopher who opposes 1467
sterilizing the effort distribution of its circumstantial causes was Brian Barry, who 1468
believed that persons should be rewarded for hard work, even if that was induced by 1469
familial culture and pressure. 1470
 The responsibility cut must also to be drawn among the different kinds of luck. As 1471
we wrote, Dworkin (1981b) distinguished between brute and option luck.  A typical 1472
example of option luck is the outcome of a deliberate gamble.  As we wrote, Fleurbaey 1473
(2008) does not advocate holding individuals responsible for the entire consequences of 1474
option luck.  He attempts to disentangle the risk-taking aspect from the purely random 1475
aspect of a gamble, considering the latter to be a circumstance.  Various compensation 1476
schemes respecting this distinction are proposed.1477
 Implementing equality of opportunity may be viewed as weakening the traditional 1478
role of the family.   Roemer (2004) has proposed that parents affect the opportunities of 1479
their children through four channels:   (C1) the provision of social connections, (C2) the 1480
formation of beliefs and skills in children through family culture and investment, (C3) 1481
genetic transmission of ability, and (C4) the formation of preferences and aspirations in 1482
children.   He views the first three as circumstances, deficits in which should be 1483
compensated by an equal-opportunity policy.   Preferences and aspirations are more 1484
complicated.  If a coal miner loves coal-mining culture and instills in his child the desire 1485
to become a miner, this is a legitimate influence that does not call for compensation.1486
What better conception of immortality is there than transferring one’s values to one’s 1487
children?    If, however, the parent instills that desire because he views no other career as 1488
being available to the child, that transfer of preference is not legitimate – that is to say, 1489
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preferences which are themselves induced by resource deficits comprise grounds for 1490
compensation.   We know of no study that attempts to disentangle the kinds of 1491
preferences parents pass on to their children in this way.1492
 One consequence of viewing (at least some) preference transmission to children 1493
from parents as morally legitimate is to recognize that even a perfect regime of equal 1494
opportunity should not aim at equalizing the rows of the intergenerational mobility matrix.1495
Parents may legitimately induce differential preferences in their children, leading to 1496
differential incomes, even if the effects of all other circumstances were miraculously 1497
compensated for.   If one does not admit this, then it is difficult to justify why we do not 1498
advocate raising children collectively.   At some point, when the unacceptable differential 1499
effects of socio-economic circumstances have been largely eliminated it will become 1500
important to address the distinction discussed with respect to channel (C4). 1501
 Finally, the importance of the nature of the objective must be taken into account. 1502
Three important objectives appear frequently in the empirical discussion. First, education, 1503
which takes place mainly during childhood and adolescence; second, income, which is 1504
closely related to conditions in the labor market; and third, health, which matters for a 1505
lifetime. Education is peculiar because a good part of it occurs before the ‘age of consent,’ 1506
that is, the age at which people should be held at least partially responsible for the various 1507
choices they make. Health, by many, is viewed as a right, in which matters of choice 1508
should not count. Thus, the scope of equal-opportunity policy may differ substantially 1509
depending upon the nature of the objective22.1510
1511
9. Do people advocate equality of opportunity? Lessons from questionnaires and 1512
experiments1513
1514
 The information reviewed here is derived both from the answers of respondents 1515
on questionnaires and from the actions chosen by players in laboratory or field 1516
                                                
22 For an early survey experiment, which shows that norms of justice differ quite 
radically depending upon what the distribuendum is, see the seminal paper of Yaari and 
Bar-Hillel (1984).
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experiments. Questionnaires are sometimes regarded with skepticism by economists, 1517
whereas they are used extensively by psychologists and political scientists (see chapter 14 1518
for more methodological issues). Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012) made a plea for the use 1519
of questionnaires in the field of social choice and justice and here we build upon their 1520
reasoning. What we desire is a procedure or protocol that helps subjects to reveal their 1521
norms of distributive justice.   We recognize that respondents can lie; Gaertner and 1522
Schokkaert (2012) ask why respondents would do so.  In the absence of self-interest, they 1523
assert, respondents will choose to reveal their true norms. (We often assume that when an 1524
agent is indifferent between cheating and telling the truth, he will tell the truth.) The main 1525
risk with questionnaires is that respondents answer at random when the question is too 1526
complex, a difficulty of which social psychologists are well aware. 1527
1528
A. Questionnaire on the empirical validity of equality of opportunity 1529
 A first source of information is provided by value surveys conducted by polling 1530
companies or scientific associations like the World Values Survey. In our opinion, these 1531
are not fully satisfactory, because the questions remain quite vague and are not related to1532
specific normative theories. Rather, they address the beliefs of respondents concerning1533
the determinants of success in a given country.1534
  Since Schokkaert and Lagrou’s (1983) early work, many surveys have been 1535
conducted, most of which propose vignettes about different aspects of life in order to 1536
inquire whether individuals’ opinions about justice coincide with the theoretical 1537
propositions put forward by social scientists (for references and overviews see 1538
Schokkaert (1999), Konow (2003), and Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012)). The literature 1539
related to our topic can be divided in two subsets. The first  tests the raw idea of 1540
responsibility.  The second is rooted in the theories of equality of opportunity proposed 1541
by Roemer and Fleurbaey. Konow (1996, 2001)’s studies, although not anchored in a 1542
theory, introduced the distinction between discretionary and exogenous variables which 1543
is very close to the responsibility cut as viewed by Cohen (1989), although Konow was 1544
apparently  unaware of Cohen’s work. A discretionary variable affects output and can be 1545
controlled or influenced by the person, while an exogenous variable can have an 1546
influence on the amount or quality of output but cannot, under normal circumstances, be 1547
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influenced by personal choice. His findings (telephone interviews with a general adult 1548
population of Los Angeles and written questionnaires completed by college students) 1549
support the view that for income acquisition, variables that are deemed to be controlled 1550
by the individual are viewed as legitimate influences upon income, whereas exogenous 1551
variables are not. 1552
 Perhaps the most thorough empirical study related to the philosophical project of 1553
equality of opportunity is that of Schokkaert and Kurt Devoogth (2003) (see also, 1554
Schokkaert and Overlaet, (1989) and  Schokkaert and Capeau (1991)). First, the authors 1555
test the two principles of “full compensation” and “natural reward” which are at the heart 1556
of Fleurbaey’s approach.  (Fleurbaey (1995) and  Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)). The 1557
principle of full compensation states that two individuals who exert the same effort 1558
should enjoy the same outcome; thus, the effect of differential circumstances is fully 1559
compensated. The principle of natural reward states that, if individuals have the same 1560
circumstances, there is no reason to transfer income between them (thus, full 1561
responsibility for effort).  Second, there is an intercultural dimension in their study, as 1562
they distributed the questionnaire to first-year university students in three very different 1563
countries: Belgium (April 1996), Burkina Faso (May 1996) and Indonesia (August 1997). 1564
(See also Gaertner and Schwettmann (2007)). Finally, this study highlights whether 1565
views of responsibility are sensitive to what we have defined as the objective (or the 1566
opportunity equalidandum), as the questionnaire addresses views of responsibility with 1567
respect to income acquisition and health.1568
 Four situations are contrasted in a two-person society. The two persons differ in 1569
only one characteristic. Possibilities of redistribution between the persons are then 1570
offered, and students are asked to choose what they think is the fair ex-post tax income 1571
distribution.1572
 The first vignette describes a difference in preferences in income-leisure space. 1573
No explanation is offered to explain this difference in tastes, whereas the second vignette 1574
stipulates that this difference comes from different backgrounds. That vignette tests the 1575
disagreement between Roemer and Barry about sterilizing the distribution of effort of the 1576
influence of circumstances. It is important here to notice that the issue raised is not the 1577
transmission of wealth, or social networks, but the transmission of values and preferences 1578
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across different generations. People convinced by Roemer’s reasoning should be more 1579
inclined to redistribute from hard-working Elizabeth to  easy-going Catherine in the 1580
second situation than in the first.  The third and fourth vignettes concern differences in 1581
productivity. In the third vignette, the difference originates in a difference of effort in the 1582
past. The fourth vignette describes a difference in innate talent.1583
 The results are instructive and we will present them in terms of how the majority 1584
voted.  The Belgian sample made the most clear-cut choice: A majority vote for no 1585
compensation at all (no redistribution) in case of Vignettes 1, 2 and 3, and for full 1586
compensation for the situation described in Vignette 4.  Thus, the Belgians endorse the 1587
view that preference for leisure is a responsibility variable  --  they agree with Brian 1588
Barry not to take the causal relationship with parents’ preferences into account.   Innate 1589
talent, however, is considered as a circumstance. Were that vote representative of Belgian 1590
choices as a citizenry, this society would possess the basic ingredients to implement an 1591
equal-opportunity policy.1592
 The authors find that the intercultural differences are much less pronounced than 1593
one might have thought. Still, they cannot be completely ignored entirely, since,1594
according to the majority vote criterion, the Burkina- Faso sample is indecisive for all 1595
four vignettes. The Indonesian vote is closer to the Belgian one. Indonesians share the 1596
same views on the three first vignettes but no majority is found on the last issue, even if 1597
the full compensation for talent has a plurality of votes.1598
 At this stage, it is useful to ask whether the objective matters. Schokkaert and 1599
Devooght (2003) attempted to adapt their questionnaire to health-care situations. From 1600
the start, two differences with income scenarios must be noticed that render the 1601
comparison less than clear-cut. In the income case, the stakes belong to the domain of 1602
gains, whereas they belong to the domain of losses in the health-care case: the health 1603
vignettes describe illness and how to cope with health-care expenditures. Since the work 1604
of Tversky and Kahneman (1991), we know a peron's tendency strongly to prefer 1605
avoiding losses to acquiring gains. This may explain a stronger inequality aversion in the 1606
health vignettes. In addition, if questions are asked about how to allocate a budget 1607
between two sick persons, an efficiency issue is raised, which makes it difficult to deduce 1608
views about fairness. All studies about fairness in health care (Dolan and Tsuchiya (2009), 1609
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Ubel et al. (1999) and the above cited paper) have chosen to formulate the vignettes in a 1610
scarcity context. Of course scarcity of resources is an important issue in the health 1611
domain (as in others) but a sequential approach with two steps might better elicit 1612
preferences about the responsibility cut.1613
 As an example consider two of the four vignettes proposed by Schokkaert and 1614
Devooght (2003), concerning Luke and Mark who are both suffering from lung cancer. 1615
They have the same wealth at their disposal and earn the same income. Luke and Mark 1616
have to be admitted to a hospital for treatment. It is supposed that all treatments are 1617
effective. The two vignettes raise the relevance of factors that are under the control 1618
(smoking) or beyond the control (genetic) of the individual for covering lung-cancer 1619
expenditure. The respondents have the choice between different divisions of the amount 1620
of public resources: equal split between the two patients, all resources for the extra cost 1621
of treating Mark, and intermediate solutions between these two.1622
 It is noteworthy that in all three societies, equal-split garners a majority of votes 1623
in vignette 1.  A majority favor an intermediate solution when genetics calls for extra cost. 1624
The social policy that this study suggests is clear-cut: smokers should purchase private 1625
insurance for coverage of smoking-related illness. This conclusion holds as long as the 1626
society is able to attribute the cause of the extra cost to life-style. These results suggest 1627
that the reason that the welfare state in many countries does not appear to be inspired by 1628
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is not due to popular ethics, but to the difficulty of 1629
identifying an indisputable causal link in health matters. Off-piste skiing is ‘the exception 1630
which proves the rule,’ where the cost of an accident is generally borne by the individual. 1631
One salient issue remains unsettled: we know of no questionnaire focusing on the link 1632
between life-style and family background. The difference of opinion between Roemer 1633
and Barry has not been reflected in the empirical literature on fairness in health.1634
 Education is another domain where we can conjecture a different attitude with 1635
respect to responsibility. Primary and secondary education take place when the person is 1636
still, arguably, below the age of consent.   Richard Arneson (1990 p.179) has appealed to 1637
this fact in egalitarian debates. Lu and Trannoy (2013) have investigated whether primary 1638
education elicits different responses from income acquisition in the degree to which 1639
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persons are held responsible for outcomes. They contrast the results obtained with two 1640
vignettes.1641
In the sales vignette, there are salesmen whose sales compensation is composed of 1642
two parts: a salary and a bonus. The issue concerns the fairness of the bonus. Sales 1643
depend on characteristics which are described as follows. The salesman’s circumstances 1644
are identified with his parents’ network of acquaintances. Effort is described as the 1645
salesman’s hard work, and talent is described as the salesman’s skill. A salesman’s brute 1646
luck is defined by the territory to which he is randomly assigned. Finally, option luck is 1647
described as the risks the salesman takes: he has to choose between selling an old product 1648
that has been on the market for a long time and is familiar to customers, or a more recent 1649
product with unknown customer reaction.   If a bonus is to be paid to the successful 1650
salesman,  respondents are asked how fair it is to judge the salesman by his 1651
circumstances, effort,  talent, brute luck,  or option luck.  The respondent has to choose 1652
exactly one answer among very unfair, rather unfair, quite fair, or absolutely fair for each 1653
of these choices. 1654
 In the school vignette, pupils face difficulties at school. Remedial tuition is 1655
supposed to help schoolwork. Five factors are related to school difficulties. 1656
Circumstances are determined by parents’ ability to help children with their homework. 1657
Effort is identified as the zeal with which the child does his homework. Talent is defined 1658
as cognitive ability, which is precisely described as an ability to concentrate. Brute luck 1659
occurs when the child missed part of the previous school year because of illness. Finally, 1660
option luck is risk-taking. The child wants to be in the advanced class, with his friends, 1661
but he cannot keep up with the class. Respondents were asked to judge the fairness of 1662





Figure 5.  The fraction of subjects holding the agent responsible for each factor (Source 1667
Lu and Trannoy (2013)).1668
1669
 Figure 5 presents the differences in the answers to both vignettes (432 1670
respondents in Marseilles).  In the sales vignette, we interpret the answers ‘quite fair’ or 1671
‘absolutely fair’ as indicating that the respondent holds the salesman responsible for the 1672
factor. In the school vignette, we interpret the answers ‘very unfair’ or ‘rather unfair’ as 1673
revealing that the pupil was deemed responsible for the factor by the respondent. A chi-1674
square test for goodness of fit is used to test whether,  subjects treated each factor 1675
similarly in the two vignettes.  Respondents evaluated moral responsibility with respect 1676
to  all causal factors except circumstances differently in the two vignettes. More 1677
specifically, salesmen were held responsible for talent, while almost no subjects held 1678
pupils responsible for talent. Only a small minority deem students responsible for risk-1679
taking while almost everyone deem the opposite for salesmen. The difference for effort is 1680
less impressive, since a small majority of respondents still agree to hold schoolboys 1681
responsible for their effort in doing homework. Our results are preliminary as they are 1682
perhaps influenced by framing.  Nevertheless,  they cast doubt on holding children 1683
responsible for educational outcomes, at least at the primary level.  If that decision is 1684
implemented, then primary-school achievements should be treated as a circumstance in 1685
studying opportunity-equalization of outcomes in later life. 1686
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B. Experiments 1687
 Fairness attitudes in sharing a cake have been studied in laboratory experiments 1688
with the ultimatum game and the dictator game (Camerer 2003), which provide a neat 1689
elicitation of preferences. These experiments reproduce exchange or distribution 1690
economies where resources are manna from heaven. Various authors (Frohlich et al; 1691
(1987 ,2004), Rutström and Williams( 2000), Konow (2000), Cappelen et al. (2007, 2010, 1692
2013),  and Almas et al. (2010) ) have conducted experiments to study explicitly what 1693
happens to people's distributive preferences by introducing an earned-money or 1694
production stage prior to a distribution phase consisting of a dictator game. The most 1695
recent articles test the prevalence of responsibility egalitarianism among distributive 1696
justice theories. More explicitly, they investigate the control view of responsibility 1697
advocated by G.A. Cohen, summarized by the principle that “only inequalities that arise 1698
from factors under individual control should be accepted”23.1699
 Cappelen et al. (2007) study a situation in which individuals differ with respect 1700
both to their investments and to the rates of return that they enjoy.  The agent chooses the 1701
amount to be invested while the rate of return is assigned randomly. The former factor is 1702
clearly an effort variable, while the rate of return is brute luck, like talent.  They assume 1703
that an individual endorses either strict equality of earnings, laissez-faire,  libertarianism 1704
(each keeps his income), or responsibility egalitarianism, in which case total income is 1705
shared in proportion to investments.  The distribution phase is  a two-person setting in a 1706
one-shot dictator game. A parametric utility function is a weighted sum of a purely 1707
selfish element, and an altruistic quadratic loss term, which is larger, the more the 1708
distribution differs from the ideal distribution according to the individual’s ethical view. 1709
The econometric analysis attempts to retrieve the parameters of the utility function, the 1710
marginal utility of money, and the preferred distributive ethic view of the subject. The 1711
authors deduce that 43.5 percent of subjects are strict egalitarians, 38.1 percent are 1712
responsibility egalitarians, and 18.4 percent are libertarians. The subject pool consisted of 1713
approximately one hundred students at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business 1714
Administration (NHH), a sample that cannot be viewed as representative of the 1715
                                                
23 Cappelen et al. (2007), p.818. 
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Norwegian society. In addition, the results may depend on the specific form of the utility 1716
function, which balances self-interest and fairness. Nevertheless, their results confirm 1717
that responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism is endorsed by a fraction of the population and 1718
competes with libertarianism and outcome egalitarianism. But we do not learn much 1719
about the responsibility cut.1720
 In a companion paper, Cappelen et al. (2010) use the same methodology and pool 1721
of students to enlarge the set of proposed fairness views. Individuals now differ with 1722
respect to three characteristics: working time, productivity, and the market price of their 1723
product.   Subjects choose their working time (effort), market price is set randomly (brute 1724
luck), and productivity (talent) is determined through a test in the experiment (the number 1725
of correctly typed words in a short period). The authors consider four competing 1726
distributional views expressed by the list of responsibility factors. An empty list 1727
corresponds to outcome egalitarianism. If effort is the only factor belonging to this list, 1728
the view is control-responsibility egalitarianism. When this list comprises effort and 1729
talent, the view is named meritocratic24 by the authors.  (In other words, people may 1730
rightfully benefit from their inborn talent.)   Finally when this list comprises effort, talent, 1731
and brute luck, it is said that the participant endorses the libertarian view. The subject 1732
pool includes students from all undergraduate years and some alumni.   The differences 1733
in preferred distributive views, as estimated by the econometric model, are not 1734
pronounced among students, but alumni have quite different ethical preferences. 1735
Whatever the age group, the meritocratic view is the most popular view among students 1736
whereas the libertarian view is slightly more popular among alumni. The striking fact is 1737
that the control view of equality of opportunity is only supported by a tiny fraction of the 1738
pool: 6% among students and 2% among alumni.  At this stage, it is premature to declare 1739
that these results are biased by a selection effect: however, let us remark that business-1740
school students and alumni are very likely among the least egalitarian people in society.1741
 In a less sophisticated way but using the same framework, Almas et al. (2010) 1742
investigate how the views about distributive justice evolve as pupils mature between the 1743
5th and 13th grades.  At the beginning of this span, schoolboys favor outcome 1744
                                                
24 See Arrow, Bowles and Durlauf (2000) for a discussion of meritocratic ideas.
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egalitarianism (2/3) and libertarianism (1/3). As the children get older, they become 1745
increasingly sensitive to equality-of-opportunity arguments and by the end of the grade 1746
span, meritocracy25 becomes the plurality view, even if it does not garner a majority of 1747
votes. Indeed it is striking that the distribution of views in this study for the 13th grade is 1748
almost the same as that obtained for the first year of college obtained by Cappelen et al 1749
(2010).1750
 If we assemble the lessons of these two instructive studies, they lead to the 1751
following conjecture for the development of distributive ideals over the life cycle. 1752
Starting with the stark and simple views of outcome egalitarianism and libertarianism in 1753
childhood, the development of cognitive skills induces understanding of more complex 1754
and less clear-cut views, like equality of opportunity. Views appear not to change 1755
significantly between the end of the high school and the end of the university.1756
 Those successful in the labor market tend more towards laissez-faire opinions. 1757
Were that true in the real world, we should observe a self-serving bias (Messick and 1758
Sentis (1983)) on a large scale, in the sense that individuals, given their degree of success, 1759
would (tend to) endorse the fairness ideal that most benefits themselves. In that sense, 1760
experiments are superior to surveys and vignettes in that they enable one to measure the 1761
extent of this self-serving bias. This phenomenon should be at its minimum when 1762
subjects are students. At this stage of development, subjects are able to understand all 1763
theories of justice but they are still shielded by a veil of ignorance regarding their degree 1764
of success (in the US, where 50% of a generation enrolls in tertiary education). The 1765
prediction would be that the difference between surveys and experiments would be 1766
minimal for this adult group.1767
 We turn now to testing popular views about option luck.   Buchanan (1986) 1768
identifies four factors that determine the distribution of income and wealth: luck, choice, 1769
effort, and birth. He considers the acceptability of rewarding effort the least controversial, 1770
and believes that the only inequalities that conflict with common views of justice are ones 1771
caused by birth (pp. 129-30). The difficulty with option luck comes from the fact that it is 1772
                                                
25 This study does not make the distinction between control-responsibility egalitarianism 
and meritocracy.
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a mix of two more fundamental factors, one for which we want to hold people 1773
responsible, choice, and the other that is exogenous, luck. A similar difficulty prevails for 1774
talent which is a mix of birth, an exogenous factor, and past effort, which is a 1775
responsibility variable.  (Buchanan does not observe the semantic convention that talent 1776
is an inborn factor, and skill results from the application of effort to talent.)1777
 Two papers, Cappelen et al. (2013) and Chanel et al. (2013), investigate the views 1778
of people about option luck and risk taking vis-à-vis the responsibility cut. The first 1779
article endeavors to shed light on the relative popularity of three views about option luck. 1780
The first view is Dworkin’s, according to which no redistribution of gains or losses from 1781
risk-taking is ethically required. Dworkin argues in favor of a laissez-faire stance, 1782
because risky lifestyles or risk-taking are expressions of preferences. The second view 1783
considers it fair to eliminate all inequalities resulting from risk-taking. The third view is 1784
intermediate between the first two: it would approve ex post redistribution between lucky 1785
and unlucky gamblers but not between gamblers and non-gamblers. This view is 1786
reminiscent of a position first defended by Le Grand (1991) and refined by Fleurbaey 1787
(2008), who considers that people should be fully insured and only bear the consequences 1788
of their decisions over the expected value of the lottery.  Gamblers will then receive the 1789
expected gain corresponding to their class of risk. The experiment consists of a risk-1790
taking phase followed by a distribution phase. In the risk-taking phase, subjects face a 1791
sequence of choices between a risky and a safe alternative, where the value of the safe 1792
alternative varies. Estimates of the choice model reveal that subjects (students at the 1793
Norwegian School of Business in Bergen) have diverse opinions and split quite evenly 1794
into three groups. Roughly speaking, two thirds of the subject pool think that people 1795
should be deemed responsible for their choice of risk-taking. The same proportion but not 1796
the same individuals think that people should not bear the consequences of luck. If we 1797
interpret the econometric results as a vote, Le Grand-Fleurbaey’s view is the Condorcet 1798
winner among the three alternatives offered to participants. This interesting result needs 1799
to be confirmed by other studies.1800
 Chanel et al (2013) are less precise in studying option luck but their aim is to 1801
deduce the relative importance of option luck in the set of factors for which individuals 1802
should be held responsible. They conduct an experiment on a large scale whose purpose 1803
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is to reveal the preferences of agents when four factors matter for earnings: circumstances, 1804
effort, brute luck, and option luck. Three experimental sessions were organized involving 1805
a treatment of about 100 subjects each, who are told that they form a small society. Each 1806
treatment involves an earned-money phase followed up by a redistribution phase, where 1807
the allocation rule is determined by majority vote. In the first phase, participants can earn 1808
money through four different channels, each of which reflects a specific factor: the place 1809
of one’s birth represents a circumstance and success at a visual-spatial attention task 1810
requires effort.  Brute luck and option luck are easily contrasted by a random draw and 1811
taking a bet, respectively. Votes are then organized on whether or not to redistribute the 1812
gains from each step, which corresponds to a given factor. A self-serving vote is found to 1813
be prevalent (about 1/3 of the sample who succeeded in earning money vote not to 1814
redistribute) and non-parametric econometrics are mobilized to retrieve the true ethical 1815
preferences beneath the votes.  The distribution of ethical preferences among the subject 1816




Figure 6. Distribution of ethical preferences about the responsibility cut (source: Chanel 1821
et al 2013). On the left vertical axis, the figures are proportions. On the right vertical axis, 1822
E stands for effort, O for option luck, B for Brute luck, C for circumstances. In each 1823
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square, 0 (respectively 1) means no compensation (resp. compensation).  For example, 1824
egalitarians think redistribution is mandated regardless of the cause of earnings. 1825
 Five ethical positions are represented here26. At the two extremes, we find the 1826
libertarian and outcome-egalitarian stances. Three intermediate positions are allowed: in 1827
EOP1, only differential circumstances merit compensation; in EOP2 brute luck in 1828
addition merits compensation. Option luck joins the compensation set with EOP3.  The 1829
two extreme positions attract almost a quarter of the views. This means that 60% of the 1830
sample endorse some version of equality of opportunity. There remains a large diversity 1831
of opinion regarding the locus of the responsibility cut. In the aggregate, the result of this 1832
experiment supports Dworkin’s view according to which we should draw a distinction 1833
between option luck and brute luck, option luck being on the responsibility side along 1834
with effort, and brute luck being on the compensation side with circumstances. 1835
Nevertheless, we need to be more careful before a more definitive conclusion is reached, 1836
for many areas of uncertainty must addressed. More specifically, the design of the 1837
experiment tests Le Grand-Fleurbay’s position against that of Dworkin. Redistributing 1838
gains from bettors to non-bettors has not been proposed to voters.1839
C. A progress report1840
 In agreement with Roemer’s suggestion (1993), we have developed the view that 1841
theory and empirical work are more complements than substitutes. As stated by 1842
Schokkaert and Gaertner (2012) “The theory of equality of opportunity offers a general 1843
and consistent framework which can be applied for any cut between effort and 1844
circumstances, while empirical work supplies the necessary information about where the 1845
boundary is drawn in different societies.”1846
 If we take again the four “primary factors” identified by Buchanan,  -- birth, luck, 1847
choice and effort27 -- it seems indisputable that subjects make a clear distinction between 1848
                                                
26 Fewer than 10% of the subjects convey an ethical preference that is not captured by one of these.
27 One wonders why it is important to distinguish between effort and choice. An answer is suggested by 
G.A. Cohen  who distinguishes difficulty from costliness.  It is difficult to lift a weight, but not costly; it is 
costly to sign a large check, but not difficult.   Effort is difficult.  Choice is often costly (as in taking a bet) 
but not difficult in the natural sense of the word.  Barry’s view that effort deserves remuneration even if not 
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the first two and the last two. In questionnaire-experiments, the assumption that choice 1849
and effort are under the control of the individuals and that participants are well-informed 1850
about the consequences of the acts cannot be disputed, since the protocols of the 1851
experiments are clear.  Even if more research is welcome, the conclusion reached by 1852
Konow (2001) ten years ago appears to stand: “To summarize, the evidence from 1853
experiments and surveys generally indicates that someone whose contribution is more 1854
highly valued is more deserving if that person bears responsibility for the contribution but 1855
not if it is due to factors outside his or her control.” Does this mean that from an 1856
empirical perspective, the control view of Arneson and Cohen prevails over the 1857
preference view of Dworkin and Fleurbaey-Maniquet ? Not exactly, for the proper test 1858
has not been conducted. Except for Schokkaert and Devooght (1983), we know of no 1859
study testing both theories in a competitive way through questionnaire-experiments. The 1860
control theory has been repeatedly tested by psychologists and economists but not against 1861
the preference theory.   We observe choices, not preferences. Economists are keen on 1862
promoting the concept of preference among social scientists; the main weakness of the 1863
concept is that preferences are not easily revealed to experts, let alone laymen.  It is 1864
asking a lot to make preferences pivotal in a theory of distributive justice that will garner 1865
mass agreement, when, at best, only some experts can argue that they have been able to 1866
deduce what preferences people hold.1867
 Equality of opportunity involves an equalizing aspect and a disequalizing one.281868
Equalization, or compensation, takes place with respect to those factors deemed 1869
circumstances; inequality is non-compensable, however, if it is due, tautologically, to 1870
factors for which individuals are held responsible.   The difficulties arise when some 1871
causes of success or failure, with respect to a desirable objective, involve mixtures of 1872
these two kinds of element.    Skill is a mixture of talent, due to birth, and past effort;1873
option luck is a mixture of choice and luck. Self-protection as defined by Ehrlich and 1874
                                                                                                                                            
due to the person’s choice can be explained if one believes that difficult actions deserve reward, regardless 
of the intent of the actor. 
28 No empirical study has tested whether people support the liberal or the utilitarian 
approach to reward (as far as we know). 
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Becker (1972) is an expenditure that reduces the probability of a loss, which can be 1875
generalized to any effort that transforms the probability distribution of states in a good 1876
way for the agent. We do not know whether the differences in views that people hold 1877
about distributive justice are due to the ambiguities introduced by the mixtures of these 1878
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10.  Inequality of opportunity: measurement issues and empirical results 1898
1899
 This section will focus on methodological issues and applications of the theory.  1900
An excellent survey of the material covered in this section is provided in Ramos and Van 1901
de gaer (2012).1902
1903
A. Methodological issues : general remarks 1904
 We begin with some general remarks for the reader who is familiar with the 1905
literature on the measurement of inequality of outcomes. Measuring inequality of 1906
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opportunity may mean different things. At the most basic level, we may want to 1907
encapsulate the inequality of opportunity with an index, as has been done for inequality 1908
of outcomes with the Gini, Atkinson, Theil and others indices. We may be more modest 1909
in just wanting to rank distributions, and be content with incomplete but robust rankings 1910
provided by instruments of a dominance analysis, such as the Lorenz curve.1911
Circumstances, effort, and luck are just sources of outcome inequality, and we may wish 1912
to trace their contribution to overall inequality. Decomposition exercises among sources 1913
are just as appropriate in EOp empirics as in inequality-of-outcome analysis. Quantifying, 1914
ranking, and decomposing are three familiar operations which we may apply to equal-1915
opportunity analysis,  and the tools are mainly borrowed from the measurement of 1916
inequality literature.1917
1918
A1. EOp measurement as a multi-dimensional problem 1919
 Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that the level of complexity of the analysis is 1920
greater because EOp is multi-dimensional. Equality-of-opportunity analysis may use the 1921
conceptual framework developed by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) in the field of 1922
multi-dimensional inequality. These authors focus on how to measure income inequality 1923
when each income unit belongs to a specific needs group. The information is two-1924
dimensional -- income and needs for each household -- and the aim of the analysis is to 1925
rank income distributions taking into account the information provided by the vector of 1926
needs. In EOp analysis, we would rank outcome distributions (income, health, education) 1927
which are unidimensional, taking into account the information provided by the vector of 1928
circumstances, the vector of efforts and perhaps the vector of residuals. EOp 1929
measurement then belongs to the family of problems of multi-dimensional inequality 1930
when margins are fixed, where margins comprise the non-outcome information that 1931
matters in EOp assessment (circumstances, effort and perhaps the residual). The 1932
inequality in the objective must be assessed conditional on the types and efforts of the 1933
population.1934
  A direct application of the sequential Lorenz quasi-ordering to this setting is not 1935
appropriate and it is interesting to see why. Of course, effort can be seen as analytically 1936
similar to needs: that is, at the margin, the more effort one makes, the more one deserves. 1937
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Reciprocally, circumstances can be seen as negative needs: the better one’s circumstances 1938
are, the less one deserves. But these two statements have limitations. We may wish not to 1939
reward effort excessively, for reasons discussed in section 4.  And regarding 1940
circumstances, there is an asymmetry: we desire to compensate for disadvantageous 1941
circumstances, but do not regard advantaged circumstances as an evil. Furthermore it is 1942
the interplay between circumstances and effort that makes the evaluation of the ensuing 1943
inequality problematic. We need to know how additional effort should be rewarded 1944
across the circumstance dimension; as we discussed, there is no clear answer to this 1945
question within the theory.  For further discussion, see Bossert (1995), Fleurbaey (1995), 1946
Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013). 1947
1948
A2. EOp as a process 1949
 What also distinguishes EOp empirical analysis from inequality-of-outcome 1950
analysis is its two-stage nature:  one generally requires an econometric-estimation stage, 1951
preceding the inequality-measurement stage. It is not so much the difference in 1952
circumstances per se that matters, but the difference in the impact of circumstances. 1953
Socio-economic advantage has to be estimated through parametric and non-parametric 1954
estimation techniques, captured by the coefficient of the circumstance variable in a linear 1955
model regressing the outcome on a set of circumstances and effort variables. An 1956
evaluation of inequality must be concerned with the process that generates it.  This leads 1957
Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) to state, provocatively, that any EOp empirical analysis 1958
must be preceded by an estimation phase to discover the best structural model leading to 1959
the results. Only in the second step should we be interested in measuring inequality of 1960
opportunity as such. 1961
  In principle, we agree.  This is, however, more easily said than done. Two 1962
observations are in order. The two main obstacles to any causal inquiry are reverse 1963
causality and endogeneity due to omitted variables. The good news is that, regarding 1964
circumstances, reverse causality can often be dismissed since circumstances are 1965
frequently characteristics of states that existed in the past (e.g., one’s parents’ education).1966
However, endogeneity cannot be discarded in that way since EOp measurement is 1967
plagued with informational problems. Omitted variables are widespread; a good example 1968
74
is provided by genetic variables which have been found paramount in income attainment 1969
by Börklund et alii (2012).   Omitted variables in empirical EOp analysis cause 1970
skepticism in claims of causality we may wish to assert.  The situation is even worse 1971
when the objective is earnings, since according to Bourguignon et al. (2007),  “…. an 1972
instrumental variable strategy is unlikely to succeed, since it is difficult to conceive of 1973
correlates of the circumstance variables that would not themselves have any direct 1974
influence on earnings. ” Experiments and quasi-experiments enable one to make causal 1975
statements, but experiments can usually only study problems which are much more 1976
circumscribed than those which interest researchers in this field. We are trying to 1977
understand the whole process by which someone reaches an income level, a health status, 1978
or an educational attainment. The processes are dynamic and cover part of the lifespan of 1979
an individual and, and understanding them fully in a causal way seems out of reach at 1980
present.   1981
 Should we worry about this lack of causal interpretation? Of course, if we want to 1982
give advice to policy makers about the true effect of leveling-the playing-field policies, 1983
impact evaluation needs to be causal. However, if one merely wants to measure the 1984
degree of inequality of opportunity -- that is inequality due to circumstances -- a 1985
correlation (with variables which occurred in the past) is already something that is1986
relevant.1987
 The challenge is even greater if we use the preference view for responsibility 1988
variables advocated by Dworkin and Fleurbaey. Retrieving the true parameter of the 1989
preferences is perhaps the most difficult issue in econometrics in terms of identification 1990
conditions (See, however,  Fleurbaey et al (2013) for an attempt to estimate the 1991
individual’s trade-off between health and income and Bargain et al (2013) for the 1992
estimation of cross-country preference heterogeneity in the consumption-leisure trade-1993
off.)1994
1995
A3. Lack of relevant information1996
 It should be clear from this discussion that we need a much richer database to 1997
perform  EOp empirical analysis than a pure inequality-of-outcome analysis. We should 1998
have variables describing the situation of the family and social background and variables 1999
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pertaining to effort. It is quite common that some important background variables are 2000
missing and then we have an incomplete description of the circumstances. More 2001
importantly, effort variables are generally missing for the very reason that effort is private 2002
information, as is emphasized in economic theory.  We must use proxies, which are 2003
problematical.2004
 The measurement of effort depends upon our view of responsibility.   On the one 2005
hand, there is the view that effort takes into account what set of actions a person can 2006
access, where access is a question not simply of physical constraints, but of 2007
psychological ones, which may be determined by one’s circumstances.  On the other 2008
hand, there is the view that a person should be held responsible for his preferences, and 2009
hence a person is responsible for taking those actions that flow from his preferences.2010
Roemer’s measurement of effort as the rank of a person’s effort in the distribution of 2011
effort of his type represents the access (or control) view: one judges the accessibility of 2012
actions to members of a type by what people in that type actually do.  (This view is also 2013
reflected in G.A. Cohen’s (1989) phrase ‘access to advantage’, which he desires to 2014
equalize.)   Dworkin and Fleurbaey represent the preference view, in which a person is 2015
held responsible for his choices, if they flow from preferences with which he identifies.2016
Because almost all empirical studies (except Fleurbaey et al (2013) and Garcia-Gomez et 2017
al. (2012)) seem implicitly guided by the control view, the authors should explain in what 2018
sense the chosen variables are under the control of the individual.  Jusot et al (2013) have 2019
argued that lifestyles in health (diet, exercise) are examples of variables under the control 2020
of the individual, and inequality of opportunity for achieving health status should be 2021
measured with this in mind.2022
 Several points that should be made about two variables that appear repeatedly in 2023
empirical analysis when trying to measure EOp in income attainment: the number of 2024
hours of work and years of education.  The number of hours of work is a good effort 2025
variable, under the control view, for self-employed occupations, but is clearly less 2026
satisfactory for wage-earners.  It is true that hours of work correspond to a quantum of 2027
effort: the issue is whether they correspond to the desired amount of hours. Part-time jobs 2028
may be involuntary; overtime work may depend on the orders of the firm, and obviously 2029
unemployment may be just bad luck. To a large extent, using hours of work in a given 2030
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period as an effort variable is therefore problematical for wage-earners.  We can be more 2031
confident that the number of hours of work over the life span is under the control of the 2032
individual because one can compensate for the impact of bad luck and low hours of work 2033
during a given period by working more in luckier periods. Using the full data for the 2034
lifespan is, however, quite rare (See Aaberge and al. (2011) or Björklund and al. (2012) 2035
for examples.) For snapshot distributions, the question arises of how to purge hours of 2036
work of bad luck, which, by assumption is not under control of the individual. Detecting 2037
chosen part-time from involuntary part-time is a difficult econometric issue. At best, we 2038
would estimate a probability that the person works voluntarily part-time, which makes 2039
the effort variable a number in the interval [0, 1]. Any empirical study that fails to do so 2040
will not respect Fleurbaey and Schokkaert’s methodological dictum to do the best to 2041
estimate the most thorough structural model before any attempt is made to measure 2042
inequality of opportunity,.2043
 Years of education is also a popular effort variable in empirical studies. It is 2044
controversial to consider it as a variable under individual control, because primary and 2045
secondary education take place when the person is a child and adolescent, largely prior to 2046
the relevant age of consent.  If a child is lazy in school, there might be factors not under 2047
his control that explain his laziness. Only tertiary education and lifelong learning are 2048
immune from this criticism. The problem with tertiary education comes from its path-2049
dependency: one’s probability of being accepted to university depends on one’s grades in 2050
secondary education, which in turn depend upon achievements in primary school.  The 2051
above-mentioned problem for the two early stages of education then contaminates higher 2052
education attainment.   2053
 A good starting point is to attempt to account for achievements in early education 2054
by circumstances of the family.   Socio-economic circumstances may be available in data 2055
sets, but parental pressure to achieve is also an important determinant of educational 2056
outcomes, and is usually not measured.  We cannot, therefore, usually give a complete 2057
account of educational achievement.   However, if one views all actions of the child as 2058
due to either nature or nurture, both of which are beyond his or her control, by hypothesis, 2059
before the age of consent, then one should simply take the child’s educational 2060
accomplishments at the age of consent as a circumstance with respect to determining 2061
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outcomes in later life.  Family circumstances may still be important in explaining choices 2062
after the age of consent: for example, a young adult might not attend college both because 2063
his achievements in secondary school were mediocre  (which, according to the view just 2064
expressed would be a circumstance) and also because his parents put little value on 2065
tertiary education (also a circumstance).  Facing these two circumstances, if a low-2066
achieving eighteen-year–old nevertheless succeeds in going to college, through taking 2067
compensatory courses, that would be ascribed to exceptional effort, ceteris paribus.2068
 In both the hours-of-work and education examples, then, we will often not have  2069
an accurate measure of effort. It will be measured with error and bias. Broadly speaking, 2070
the authors do not pay sufficient attention to these problems and overlook their practical 2071
implications. Since effort measurement does not have the same robustness as 2072
circumstance measurement, choosing effort as the conditioning variable as in the tranche 2073
approach (see for instance Peragine (2004 and 2008)) seems risky. True, circumstances 2074
may be only partially described, but generally they are not noisy. Since tranche and type 2075
approaches seem incompatible (see below), conditioning on type seems a better choice 2076
than conditioning on tranches.2077
2078
A4. Age and sex 2079
 The issue of availability of information cannot be raised about age and sex. The 2080
problem is how to treat these variables.  Under the control view, age and sex are 2081
circumstances.   Under the preference view, because age and sex  are important 2082
determinants of preference, they will implicitly enter as factors of effort!  Because, under 2083
this view, preferences should be respected whatever they are unless they are not well-2084
informed, they are put on the responsibility side of the cut. Of course, as Fleurbaey and 2085
Schokkaert (2009) pointed out, we are free, once the true impact of age and sex has been 2086
identified econometrically, to test whether it matters to put age and sex on one side or on 2087
the other (see Garcia-Gomez et al. (2012) for an application). When we are explaining 2088
health, it does not come as a surprise to learn that 45% of the explained variance in health 2089
comes from these two demographic variables (see Jusot et al. (2013)).  This is not the 2090
thorniest issue in EOp measurement, but the reader should be aware that the extent of 2091
inequality of opportunity may depend on whether or not one includes these variables in 2092
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the responsibility set. For instance, Almas et al. (2011) put age among the responsibility 2093
variables, on the ground that our concern should be with inequality of lifetime earnings. 2094
Another solution would be to exit the dual world of the model and to admit that there are 2095
variables that are neither under the control of the individual nor for which compensation 2096
is due.  An example is provided in the health sphere where it is admitted, by most, that 2097
health policies cannot erase the impact of demographics.  (We should not consider males 2098
disadvantaged with respect to females if, due to innate biological factors, their life 2099
expectancy is shorter.)   For earnings achievement, this stance cannot be easily argued, 2100
because differences in returns, linked to gender and perhaps age, may be related to 2101
discrimination, which would obviously be a violation of EOp.2102
 As in other domains of econometrics, there is a large issue of what to do with 2103
poor data. The mistake to avoid is pretending that a poor data set is rich.  Innovative 2104
methods exist to deal with  missing variables. An important methodological issue that has 2105
been raised and partially solved is to deduce what can be said about inequality of 2106
opportunity when we know that the observables are far from recovering the process 2107
through which the objective has been attained. We should adapt our empirical strategy to 2108
the richness of the informational structure of the database. Basically, we can contrast 2109
situations from the richest informational setting to the poorest one. In the first situation, 2110
we have a good description of the world, that is, a quite comprehensive set of 2111
circumstances and some candidates for effort variables. In the second situation, no effort 2112
variables are available and individuals can be ranked in broad type categories.  We will 2113
contrast the methods accordingly. 2114
    2115
 B. The estimation phase 2116
B1. The case of rich data set2117
 The first choice is to decide between parametric and  non-parametric estimation. 2118
Because, by assumption, there are many observable variables, a parametric estimation 2119
will fit the data better (see, Pistolesi (2009) for a semi-parametric estimation). 2120
Bourguignon et al. (2007) took the lead regarding the econometric strategy in this case. 2121
We should estimate a system of simultaneous equations. The first equation will describe 2122
the process of attainment of the outcome. In the income context, it can be called a return 2123
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equation, the coefficient of each determinant giving the marginal return (in a linear 2124
model) of each determinant whether it is a circumstance, effort , or demographic variable. 2125
The other equations (one for every effort variable) will relate the effort variable to 2126
circumstances and other control variables. In the control view of responsibility variables, 2127
we should understand how variables that are outside the control of the individual 2128
influence her effort variables. In these ‘reaction equations’ circumstances must be 2129
introduced, including market conditions (prices, any market disequilibrium such as the 2130
local rate of unemployment for job decisions) and demographics. One supposes that the 2131
reaction of individuals to their environments (market and background conditions) may 2132
vary across individuals. We should let the coefficients vary according to demographics. 2133
The difference in the value of these coefficients, if any, would be interpreted in a 2134
different way according to the control versus the preference view. According to the latter, 2135
they are preference shifters, whereas according to the former they are driven by 2136
circumstances, and belong to the non-responsibility side of the cut.2137
 We introduce some notation. Let yi be the outcome of individual i (the original 2138
outcome variable or some function of it), Ci the vector of circumstances, Ei = (ei1,..., eij, ,...,2139
eik ) the vector of effort of dimension k, Di the vector of demographics, Mi the market 2140
conditions prevailing for i, i, the mean-zero residual of the return equation and oij the 2141
mean-zero residual of the reaction equation of effort j. The other letters employed are for 2142
coefficients of both regressions. In the simplest linear model the following equations 2143
have to be estimated: 2144
2145
yi = μy1+ c Ci + d Di + eEi, + i.,                    (10.1) 2146
2147
eij = + c Ci + d Di + mMi, + cd Ci Di + cm Mi Di + ij.,  for each effort variable 2148
j = 1,…,k                                                                                                (10.2) 2149
2150
Equation (10.2) is written in a compact way: coefficients  describe the average reaction 2151
of adjusting effort to external conditions while coefficients  are the ‘preference shifters’ 2152
which allow individuals to adjust in a different way according to their age and sex group.2153
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 It is plausible that market conditions do not always explain the outcome (for 2154
instance the price of fruit and vegetables may impact the diet, while having no impact on 2155
mortality rate). If this is the case, we may have exclusion restrictions that will be helpful 2156
to identify the system.2157
 The omitted variables (perhaps IQ or any measure of innate talent) may impact 2158
the residuals of all equations. The structure of residuals may follow some common 2159
pattern that can be captured by a correlation between disturbance terms. (See table 1 in 2160
Garcia-Gomez et al. (2012) for an implementation for mortality outcome.)  If the 2161
correlation is significant, it may reveal an omitted covariate that matters for the 2162
estimation of the full system. However, we cannot tell if the revealed omitted variables 2163
are on the circumstances or effort side.2164
 Many authors (Bourguignon et al. (2007), Trannoy et al.(2010) for example) have 2165
argued that  the estimation of the full system is not necessary if we are only interested in 2166
determining the full impact of circumstances. Estimating the reduced form (10.3) suffices 2167
if we want to measure the impact of observable circumstances:2168
yi = μy3 + c Ci + d Di + i.,    (10.3) 2169
2170
This statement, however, requires some qualification. Neglecting the shift parameter, it is 2171
true that in a linear model c = c + e c ,  due to the Frisch-Waugh theorem, c captures 2172
the direct effect of circumstances and e c captures the indirect effect of circumstances 2173
through effort.  (The same goes for demographics.)  However, the relation is lost for a 2174
non-linear model, such as a logit or probit specification, even if Jusot et al. (2013) found 2175
that the difference between c and c + e c is quite small. More importantly, the reduced 2176
form (10.3), which has been repeatedly estimated in empirical studies, does not allow the 2177
effect of circumstances on outcomes to be mediated by demographics.  The information 2178
provided by the preference shifters  introduced in the reaction equations (10.2) is lost. It 2179
will be split into the reduced coefficient of circumstances, the reduced coefficient of 2180
demographics and perhaps the residual. A solution would be to introduce a cross effect of 2181
circumstances and demographics in the reduced equation but, to some extent, the effect 2182
of demographics as shifters of preferences will go beyond the cross effect in the structural 2183
model. The basic message here is that, with a reduced form, we cannot isolate the effect 2184
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of demographics as circumstances from the effect of demographics as shifters of 2185
preferences, and therefore responsibility variables:  to do so,  we would need to estimate 2186
the full structural model. We recall the claim of Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) that 2187
failing to estimate a structural model is costly in terms of the limitations that are thereby 2188
imposed in the measurement phase.2189
 We now comment on the impact of omitted variables on the estimation. The 2190
coefficients will be biased and cannot be interpreted as causal. An example from health is 2191
the presence of lead in a child’s home, which could entail health problems for both 2192
children and parents. If this variable is missing in the dataset, a correlation between the 2193
health status of children and parents will be observed, whereas there is no causal link. It 2194
would then be unwise to base policy recommendations on the estimates of the structural 2195
model (10.1) and (10.2) or the reduced model (10.3). Other empirical strategies have to 2196
be implemented if we want to use the estimates in this way. Regarding the reduced form, 2197
it must be clear that the estimate ˆ c
29  conveys the impact of any unobserved variable2198
correlated with observable circumstances. If these variables are circumstances, this is fine 2199
from a correlation viewpoint. We can claim that ˆ cCi   gives a fair account of the 2200
contribution of all factors linked to observable circumstances to the income of individual 2201
i.2202
 The interpretation becomes trickier if all the unobservables correlated with 2203
circumstances are not interpreted as circumstances. Let us take the example of innate 2204
talent and suppose that an accurate measure is IQ. We have advocated treating IQ, 2205
measured before the age of consent, as a circumstance.  However, as is clear from 2206
surveys and questionnaires (see section 8), opinions are quite diverse on this question.  If 2207
we follow the self-ownership view, it should be a responsibility variable (i.e., persons 2208
would deserve to benefit from their high IQs).  Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) have argued 2209
that the reduced form will lead (through the computation of Ci) to a lower bound 2210
estimate of circumstances. If the missing variables in the reduced form are classified as 2211
efforts and are positively correlated to observable circumstances such as IQ, it is the other 2212
way round. Instead of having a downward bias, the impact of circumstances would be 2213
                                                
29 A circumflexed variable denotes an estimate. 
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biased upward. The remedy is not trivial because any other simple solution fails to solve 2214
the problem. Estimating a reduced form with only observable effort would convey the 2215
impact of circumstances correlated with effort, which conflicts with the message of EOp. 2216
Now the estimates given by the structural model will be even more at odds with the ethics 2217
of EOp. The impact of unobservable IQ will be split into the various coefficients 2218
estimated in the return equation (10.1) plus the residual, meaning that some part of innate 2219
talent would be assimilated with responsibility characteristics and some part would be 2220
non-responsibility characteristics. At this stage, we should recognize that since innate 2221
talent is a form of luck, the parametric estimation is too restricted to cope with luck (see 2222
below).2223
 One of the virtues of the structural model is that it enables one to decompose the 2224
impact of the circumstances into a direct and an indirect term (through effort). 2225
Bourguignon et al (2007) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) acknowledge that sub-2226
decompositions into direct or indirect effects, or into the effects of individual 2227
circumstances, would be strongly affected by the presence of omitted variables. 2228
Bourguignon et al. (2013) show that it is no so much the magnitude of inequality of 2229
opportunity , but rather its decomposition between direct and indirect effects, that will be 2230
affected by biased estimates of coefficients of circumstances in both the return and the 2231
reaction equations.2232
 We conclude with the interpretation of the residuals of the various equations. We 2233
first emphasize that they are not orthogonal to the regressors with omitted variables, 2234
which is worrying. That said, the residuals of the reaction equation are close in spirit to 2235
the Roemerian effort. They are effort sterilized of the impact of circumstances and 2236
external conditions. This leads Jusot et al. (2013) to estimate an equation where we 2237
substitute Roemerian effort for effort in equation (10.1), namely: 2238
2239
   yi = μy4+ cCi + d Di + e  i + i.,          (10.4) 2240
2241
where  denotes the vector of residuals of equations (10.2). Due to the Frisch-Waugh 2242
theorem, the coefficient of Roemerian effort will be the same as the coefficient of true 2243
effort, whereas the coefficients of circumstances and demographics will be augmented by 2244
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their indirect influence through effort and then equal to the coefficients estimated in the 2245
reduced equation (10.3)30.  This enables these authors to offer a decomposition of the 2246
inequality into responsibility,  non-responsibility, and  demographic parts, in the spirit of 2247
Roemer. They contrast the results with the estimates obtained with equation (10.1) where 2248
the impact of circumstances is only direct and thus follows Brian Barry’s 2249
recommendation  (individuals should be rewarded for their absolute, not relative, effort).2250
 It should be clear from the previous discussion that the residual of the return 2251
equation (10.1) is a mixed bag of error terms and omitted variables, which may be 2252
circumstances, effort, or luck variables. Generally the error term represents a large part of 2253
the variance, more than 70% in Björklund et al. (2012) for the residual of the reduced 2254
form (10.3). It is quite normal that the explained part remains small on cross-sectional 2255
estimation: 30% is already an achievement. Should we assign the residual to the effort or 2256
circumstance side? Several views clash here. Roemer and his co-authors over the years 2257
put the residual of the reduced equation on the effort side while Devooght (2008) and 2258
Almas et al. (2010) put the residual of the structural return equation on the circumstance 2259
side31. Lefranc et al. (2009) and Jusot et al. (2013) argue that these solutions are ad hoc. 2260
They prefer to maintain the position that we cannot tell what the residual represents. 2261
Furthermore, when it represents 50% of the variance or more, putting it on one side or the 2262
other will determine the relative magnitude of inequality of opportunity. Consequently, 2263
they prefer to discard it in any decomposition analysis and move on with the explained 2264
part of the outcome, from (10.1): 2265
2266
       i = y1+ c Ci + d Di + eEi,  .                                     (10.5) 2267
2268
                                                
30 In fact, it is not quite correct if market conditions and shift parameters are introduced 
as in (10.2). The statement is valid for a simple form of (10.2).
31 They also present robustness results where the residual belongs to the responsibility set. 
Almas (2008) considers both alternatives. 
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Parametric  methods try to estimate the conditional expectation E(y|C,E).32 Non-2269
parametric methods are more ambitious because they try to estimate the conditional 2270
distribution F(y|C,E). O’Neill et al (2000) were the first to use a kernel density estimator 2271
to estimate the distribution of income conditional on parental income. It is not by 2272
accident that the authors chose a continuous variable (parental income) to perform a non-2273
parametric analysis. The parametric estimation already offers some flexibility for discrete 2274
variables. Pistolesi (2009) borrows a semi-parametric estimation technique from Donald 2275
et al.(2000). In a nutshell, since the hazard rate is defined as, 2276
H(y) =   , 2277
with S (.|.) the conditional survivor function, one can write : 2278
     2279
The trick is then to estimate a hazard-function-based estimator and introduce covariates 2280
using a proportional-hazards model. In a second step, the necessary transformations using 2281
the above equation are made to obtain an estimate of the associated conditional density 2282
function.  It is known that the estimation of duration models is more flexible than of 2283
linear models.  In substance, Pistolesi estimates the conditional distributions 2284
corresponding to equations (10.1) and (10.2) with this estimation technique.2285
2286
B2. The case of a poor dataset2287
 The distinctive feature of a poor data set is that no effort variable is available, but 2288
we may still have a rich set of circumstances and a large sample. We can construct types 2289
but we cannot a priori build tranches. The approach here comes from Roemer (1993, 2290
1996, 1998)  with his identification axiom. It is the only assumption that enables us to say 2291
something about inequality of opportunity in the poor-information case. It is non-2292
parametric in essence, since effort is deduced from the distribution of outcome for a type, 2293
F(y|C). Two individuals located at the same quantile of their type-conditional distribution 2294
are defined as having exerted the same effort, which will be denoted eRO. Formally, 2295
starting from the income generating process given by 2296
                                                
32 E denotes the expectation operator.
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2297
the Roemer identification axiom (RIA) reads:2298
2299
By construction, this effort is distributed uniformly over [0, 1] for all types. This way of 2300
identifying effort has been used by O’Neill et al (2000) in a non-parametric setting to 2301
depict the opportunity set of an heir defined as the income range that she can reach for all 2302
levels of Roemerian efforts belonging to [0, 1]. The opportunity sets are contrasted 2303
according to the level of advantage given by the decile of parental income.2304
 This way of identifying effort has also been used by Peragine (2004, 2008) to 2305
build a tranche approach to EOp where the multivariate distribution is described by a 2306
matrix whose typical element is the income for a given type and percentile of the type-2307
conditional income distribution. However, this approach is not immune to the omitted 2308
variable problem that was discussed above. As was rightly pointed out by Ramos and 2309
Van de gaer (2012), omitted circumstances induce wrong identification of the Roemerian 2310
effort unless the unobserved circumstances, after conditioning on observed 2311
circumstances, no longer affect income (see their Proposition 6). This is a strong 2312
condition that will be rarely be satisfied in empirical work.2313
  The identification axiom may be questionable from an analytical point of view 2314
(see Fleurbaey (1998)), because it is not clear how multi-dimensional effort can be 2315
aggregated into one indicator, and luck factors can interact with effort in a complex way. 2316
The view that the distribution of effort specific to a type  is a circumstance makes sense 2317
in the control view but not in the preference view.  Let us coin this axiom as the type-2318
independent effort distribution: the relevant normative effort distribution should be 2319
independent of type. This axiom is clearly weaker than Roemer’s identification axiom. It 2320
has inspired fruitful empirical strategies, both in a parametric and non-parametric setting. 2321
In the former case, Björklund et al. (2012) estimated a reduced form as in (10.3) with i a 2322
Gaussian white noise. They assimilate the distribution of the residual to the distribution 2323
of effort. However, the distribution of the residual can vary across types and this variation 2324
is a non-responsibility characteristic. They have corrected for variation in the second 2325
moment by adding and subtracting to the regression equation a residual term that has the 2326
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overall variance. Hence the relevant effort in each type is renormalized to have the same 2327
variance. 2328
 In a non-parametric setting, Lefranc et al. (2009) retain this independence view of 2329
effort, which is postulated in the Roemer identification axiom,  without assuming that we 2330
can identify effort with the quantile of the type-conditional income distribution.  Let the 2331
distribution of effort conditional on type (supposed to be unidimensional)  be given by 2332
They assume that the relevant effort is the relative effort denoted  given by the 2333
quantile within the effort distribution of an individual’s type:2334
                                                  (10.6)2335
Equipped with this conception of effort, they are able to link what we can check (in a 2336
poor setting) with what we would want to check if we had all the information about 2337
effort. What we can check is obviously the equality of the distribution of income 2338
conditional on the observables, here, only the vector of circumstances:2339
2340
   For any (C,C ), F( |C) = F( |C ) .      (conditional-distribution equality)   (10.7) 2341
2342
We have already stated (see Section 5) that we would like luck to be even-handed in a 2343
world where all circumstances and effort are observed.2344
2345
For any ( , ', )C C e ( | , ) ( | ', ) ( | )F C e F C e K e= =    (equal-luck opportunity) (10.8) 2346
2347
This allows the distribution of episodic luck to depend on effort but not on circumstances. 2348
Their main result, mathematically obvious but of practical importance, is that a necessary 2349
condition for equal-luck opportunity to be satisfied is conditional-distribution equality, if 2350
we use relative effort. Mathematically, if we replace e by , in (10.8), then (10.8) 2351
implies (10.7). Is this result false if some circumstances are non-observed? Proposition 5 2352
in Lefranc et al (2009) proves that this is not the case. Checking the conditional-2353
distribution equality on the set of observed circumstances is still necessary for the global 2354
equality of opportunity condition to be satisfied. These results pave the way for using 2355
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stochastic-dominance tools33 to measure the unfairness of the distribution, which we 2356
discuss below. 2357
2358
  C. The measurement phase2359
 Once a model has been estimated, the question of how to proceed to use the 2360
estimations obtained in the econometric phase remains open. Various choices have been 2361
proposed concerning three issues:  the types versus tranches approach, the direct 2362
unfairness versus the fairness gap, and the inequality index. We will deal with these three 2363
approaches in turn.2364
2365
C1. Types versus Tranches2366
 A way to organize the information in a discrete setting is to construct a matrix in 2367
which rows are types and columns effort. An element mij  of the matrix is the outcome for2368
type i and effort level j. It is important to emphasize that this way of proceeding is correct 2369
if and only if the knowledge of circumstances and effort is sufficient to determine the 2370
outcome level. It means that, with respect to the decomposition of the process allowed by 2371
the regression, the residual is assigned to either effort or circumstances, unless the 2372
outcome is replaced by the predicted outcome. In this setting, two principles of 2373
compensation can be stated.  First, we define a tranche as the set of individuals who 2374
expend the same degree of effort. 2375
 The tranche-compensation principle states that the closer each column is to a 2376
constant vector, the better. If for some effort (column), the inequality of outcome across 2377
types is reduced, and everything else remains unchanged, equality of opportunity has 2378
been improved.2379
 The type-compensation principle states that it is good to transfer from an 2380
advantaged type to a disadvantaged type, provided that the ranking of types is respected.2381
Suppose that between two types, one is unambiguously better off than the other,  that is, 2382
the outcomes can be ranked unambiguously according to first-order stochastic dominance. 2383
                                                
33 It is possible to go beyond stochastic dominance to define the relative advantage of a 
type (see Herrero et al. (2012) for a proposal involving an eigenvalue of a matrix).
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Then a transfer from the dominant type to the dominated type for some effort level, 2384
ceteris paribus, is EOp enhancing. This principle can be extended further to a second-2385
order stochastic dominance test (Lefranc et al. (2009)). Indeed if two types have the same 2386
average outcome but the first one has a larger variance, any risk-averse decision maker 2387
would prefer to belong to the second type and consequently one cannot declare that the 2388
two types have the same opportunities in terms of risk prospects. The need to take into 2389
account the risk dimension echoes the treatment of heteroscedasticity of the residuals in 2390
the parametric case by Björklund et al.(2012). This extension leads to a weak criterion of 2391
equality of opportunity, which corresponds to a situation of absence of second-order 2392
stochastic dominance across types34.2393
 Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013) show by the means of an example that the two 2394
principles clash. There is no complete ordering of the full domain of (positive) matrices, 2395
which respects both principles. If we connect this to the results obtained by Lefranc et al. 2396
(2009), it is as if we said that equal-luck opportunity conflicts with conditional-2397
distribution equality.35  They claim that a choice should be made between the two 2398
principles. Logically this is correct. Empirically, it seems to us, that the conflict is not 2399
that deep because the principles are useful in different informational contexts.  Either, 2400
one trusts the information about effort and the tranche-compensation principle is 2401
appropriate, or one lacks the information about effort, or believes it is insufficiently 2402
reliable because of the omitted variable problem, and then the type-compensation 2403
principle remains available.2404
 Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013) also point out that the tranche-compensation 2405
principle clashes with two principles of reward, the principle of natural reward and the 2406
principle of utilitarian reward.  Ramos and Van de Gaer (2012) showed that this 2407
incompatibility extends to another principle of reward inspired by a criticism of Roemer 2408
                                                
34  These two principles have been dubbed  ex ante (type) and  ex post (tranche) 
approaches by Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013). The terms are misleading because ex post 
and ex ante usually refer to a situation with uncertainty which is not explici here. 
35 The comparison is not artificial because to some extent, both principles can be viewed 
as a ranking adaptation of  (10.7) and (10.8).
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against the principle of natural reward. It seems to us that this kind of conflict should not 2409
be overemphasized if we agree to prioritize the principles. If we annihilate the inequality 2410
due to circumstances according to the tranche-compensation principle, then in each 2411
column, each element is equal to its tranche average before the redistribution took place.2412
Hence this redistribution according to the tranche compensation principle respects a 2413
simple natural arithmetic average reward principle: the arithmetic average income 2414
difference due to differences in effort should remain invariant to redistribution. At this 2415
stage, this principle of reward reduces to the principle of natural reward and no more 2416
redistribution is required to comply with the requirements of EOp. 2417
 We conclude with an insight borrowed from Ramos and Van de gaer (2013), who 2418
remark that if we retain the Roemerian effort, annihilating inequality within the columns 2419
of the matrix implies equalizing the prospects for each type, since by construction the 2420
distribution of Roemerian effort is the same for every type.2421
2422
C2. Direct Unfairness versus Fairness Gap 2423
 Almost the same idea appears in the papers of Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) 2424
and Pistolesi (2009) concerning how to measure inequality due to circumstances.  We 2425
will here retain the nomenclature of the former authors, while we are closer to the latter 2426
in terms of the definitions. These authors propose two approaches.2427
 Direct unfairness (DU) is computed as the inequality of the counterfactual 2428
distribution when one has removed the effect of effort variables, either by suppressing 2429
them, or by imputing to each individual a reference value of effort such as the average 2430
value.  Following are some examples of possible computations of direct unfairness, 2431
where I denotes some inequality index.2432
 For the reduced form (10.3), a natural choice for direct unfairness is to compute 2433
the inequality of the conditional expectation of outcomes across types (a solution first 2434
proposed by Van de gaer (1993)). Since the regression decomposes the conditional 2435
expectation, we get2436
2437
  I (E(y|Ci, Di)) = I( y3 + c Ci + d Di) (10.9)2438
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which is a neat solution chosen by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). The residual is set to 0, 2439
its mean value.2440
 For the more structural model (10.1) or (10.4), where an estimation of the impact 2441
of the effort variable has been obtained, it is possible to set the effort variable to 0 or to 2442
consider some reference value such as the average effort. The inequality of the 2443
conditional expectation of outcome for an average effort level is given by362444
 I (E(y|Ci, Di, ) = I( y1+ c Ci + d Di + e i,)                                           (10.10)2445
A potential problem for both the above calculations is that the distribution of estimated 2446
residuals across types may be type-dependent. If so, then the difference in the mean of 2447
estimated residuals across types should be taken into account.2448
 The fairness gap (FG) measures the gap between the inequality of the actual 2449
distribution and the inequality of a counterfactual distribution in which all the effects of 2450
circumstantial variables have been removed, either by suppressing them, or by imputing 2451
to each individual a reference value of circumstances such as the average one.  We give 2452
some examples below. If we had estimated a reduced form with only effort variables 2453
(something that has not been done in the literature so far), we could have the analog of 2454
formula (10.9) with an estimation of the inequality of the expected outcomes across 2455
tranches when circumstances are in the residual and have been removed. Computing 2456
directly from the data the average outcome of those sharing the same effort, as done by 2457
Checchi and Peragine (2010), is a non-parametric way of doing this. The fairness gap is 2458
then given by372459
                                                        I(y) -  I (E(y|Ei))      .                                  (10.11)2460
For the more structural model (10.1) or (10.4), where both effort and circumstances 2461
variables are introduced as regressors, we can do better and estimate the fairness gap for a 2462
counterfactual distribution where the set of circumstances has been set to a reference 2463
value, for example, the average one. Then one obtains for the fairness gap2464
                                                
36 An overbar on a variable  denotes a mean. 
37 Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009) are the only who propose to apply the inequality 
index to the gap. The other authors compute the gap between total inequality and the 
inequality of the counterfactual distribution.
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2465
 I(y) -  I (E(y| i, i,Ei) = I(y) - I( y1+ c i + d i + e ).       (10.12) 2466
2467
 Bourguignon et al. (2007) propose a similar measure. The problem is, again, how to 2468
assign the residual. According to (10.12), the residual has been removed and is 2469
considered as measuring a circumstance. The above authors implicitly consider the 2470
residual as measuring effort. Another solution is to replace the overall inequality by the 2471
explained inequality, that is, remembering that i  is the explained outcome (see equation 2472
(10.5)), to compute  : 2473
                              I( i )    - I( y1+ c i + d i + e ),                (10.13) 2474
a solution chosen by Jusot et al (2013). 2475
 The reference values in (10.10) and (10.12) are somewhat arbitrary and we can 2476
compute the formula for different values and then take the arithmetic mean. DU and FG 2477
as defined above are defined in absolute value. They can of course be defined in relative 2478
terms and be divided by the overall inequality.  Several recent empirical studies (e.g. 2479
Aaberge et al (2011), Checchi and Peragine (2010)) perform both estimations of the 2480
inequality of opportunity as robustness checks.2481
 The measurement of unjust inequality using direct unfairness is linked to the 2482
tranche-compensation principle as follows: if direct unfairness computed according to 2483
formula (10.10)38 for some matrix m is lower than for some other matrix m   for all 2484
inequality indices, then m is preferred to m  according to the tranche-compensation 2485
principle where the considered transfers are of the Pigou-Dalton sort.  Similarly, there is a 2486
link between the type-compensation principle and the fairness gap. Indeed, if m is2487
preferred to m  according to the type-compensation principle, then  the FG is lower for m2488
than for m , computed according to (10.12), for all inequality indices when the reference 2489
type is different from the two types involved in the Pigou-Dalton transfer. The statement 2490
is not as general for FG as for DU since we cannot extend the above statement whatever 2491
the reference type, the choice of which is ad hoc. This leads some authors to consider 2492
instead a weighted average of the FG. In that case it can be proved that, if m is preferred 2493
                                                
38 In a parametric or non-parametric way.
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to m  according to the type-compensation principle, then the weighted39 sum of the FGs 2494
is lower for m than for m , computed according to (10.12), for all inequality indices 2495
belonging to the entropy class. 2496
 We conclude the discussion of direct unfairness and the fairness gap by observing 2497
that the concepts in substance are not new as methods of decomposing inequality among 2498
its sources. When Shorrocks (1980) advocated the use of the variance, he observed in his 2499
conclusion that when one thinks about the contribution of one source to inequality, one 2500
can wonder either about how much inequality is left when the impact of this inequality 2501
factor is neutralized, or about how much inequality remains when the other sources are 2502
equalized. This is exactly the choice available in the literature on EOp measurement. 2503
Shorrocks also observed that when there are two sources (here, the set of circumstances 2504
and the set of effort variables) the natural decomposition of the variance given by the 2505
covariance of the source with outcome has a nice interpretation: the covariance of a 2506
source is just equal to the arithmetic mean of the above two computations. In the context 2507
of EOp, this means that the covariance of circumstances with outcome is the arithmetic 2508
mean of the direct unfairness and fairness gap when the other source is removed in the 2509
computations (not put at a reference level).  This point was made by Jusot and al. (2013) 2510
and and by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) (see their appendix).2511
2512
C3. The choice of an index 2513
 The entire spectrum of inequality indices has been used by researchers in EOp, 2514
perhaps with the exception of Atkinson’s indices. One can speculate that the absence of 2515
the Atkinson indices is due to EOp’s not being a welfarist theory.  Lefranc et al. (2009b) 2516
and Almas et al (2011) have used the Gini index, and  Aaberge et al.(2011) have used the 2517
rank-independent measures.   Elements of the entropy family have been used by 2518
Bourguignon et al.(2007) who picked the Theil index, and Checchi and Peragine (2010), 2519
                                                
39 For the statement to be true, the weights cannot be chosen arbitrarily. The weight of a 
type is given by the weight of this type in the between-type term.
93
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), Lefranc et al. (2012) use the mean logarithmic deviation 2520
(MLD).  Pistolesi (2009) and Björklund et al. (2012) are eclectic and use a range of 2521
measures. These examples are when the objective is income attainment, and they are 2522
relative measures.   When the objective is health status (self-assessed health or mortality), 2523
it makes sense to use an absolute measure such as the variance, a choice made by Jusot 2524
and al (2013) and Bricard et al (2013),  which possesses the decomposition property 2525
mentioned above.   However, the variance is not such a good choice for income 2526
attainment since it is not relative. Returning to the income case, there is no first-best 2527
choice. The connection with stochastic dominance, which is the advantage of rank-2528
dependent measures, among them the Gini index, is counterbalanced by the 2529
decomposability properties of the entropy family.    The relevant decomposition is among 2530
sources of inequality, and not so much among subpopulations, and the Shapley 2531
decomposition (Chantreuil and Trannoy (2013) and Shorrocks (2013)) can be applied to 2532
any inequality index.2533
 The property of path independence of the MLD pointed out by Foster and 2534
Shneyerov (2000) has recently been emphasized by Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) to 2535
single out this index. Indeed, path independence is interesting in the context of EOp 2536
because it can be interpreted as saying that the inequality measured by the direct 2537
unfairness criterion be equal to the inequality measured by the fairness gap. This 2538
proposition has to be qualified. Direct unfairness is computed as the inequality of the 2539
average outcome across types. The fairness gap is obtained by rescaling the distribution 2540
of the outcome due to effort by the ratio of average income to average income in a type. 2541
This is one among many possibilities for nullifying the impact of circumstantial factors. 2542
Thus, if we find this way of neutralizing the impact of circumstantial inequalities 2543
appealing for the fairness gap, then we do not have to worry about computing two 2544
measures of EOp because they are equivalent (under path independence).  We conclude 2545
by saying that in the health realm, variance may be a better choice, while MLD is 2546
prominent for income achievement.2547
2548
 D. Results  2549
2550
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 It is beyond our scope to present a unified treatment of all empirical results.  As 2551
argued earlier, the estimates of inequality of opportunity are likely a lower bound of the 2552
true figure in all cases and the magnitude of the underestimation is inversely related to 2553
the richness of the dataset. Consequently, the importance of the empirical results has to 2554
be gauged by considering the number of types that can be defined with the dataset. 2555
Intriguing issues that may arouse the curiosity of the readers can be easily identified. 2556
First, what is the extent of equality of opportunity with respect to overall inequality? 2557
What is the contribution of effort to inequality, is it larger than that of circumstances? Is 2558
the indirect contribution of circumstances through its impact on effort sizeable?  Does it 2559
make much difference to follow Roemer’s viewpoint in measuring effort, or will using 2560
absolute measures of effort give similar results? Among circumstances, what are the most 2561
significant? Is there a common pattern among inequalities of opportunity with respect to 2562
the objectives of health, education and income? Is there a difference of magnitude in 2563
inequality of opportunity between the developed countries and the developing countries? 2564
Does the ranking of countries differ when we look at inequality of opportunities versus 2565
inequality of outcomes? Do taxes and benefits or other instruments make a large 2566
difference when measuring EOp?   (I.e., inequality of opportunity for pre-fisc versus 2567
post-fisc income.)2568
 Starting from a very coarse definition of types, (three levels for father’s education, 2569
five levels for income), Lefranc et al. (2009b) found that Sweden and Norway almost 2570
achieve equality of opportunity for income, while at the other extreme in the range of 2571
western countries lie Italy and the US, with other European countries in the middle.  The 2572
qualitative results are similar to those of Roemer et al (2003).  We will take a closer look 2573
at the Nordic countries before reporting the results obtained for Italy and the US.  We 2574
will then contrast these results with those obtained for Latin America, Africa and Turkey. 2575
 Three thorough empirical studies have studied EOp for income in Scandinavia: 2576
Aaberge et al. (2011) and Almas et al. (2011) for Norway, and Björklund et al. (2012) for 2577
Sweden. Starting with the latter, the authors claim that they have a fine-grained typology 2578
(1152 types), which partitions the sample into types based upon  parental income quartile 2579
group (four groups), parental education group (three groups), family structure/type (two 2580
groups), number of siblings (three groups), IQ quartile groups (four groups), and body 2581
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mass index (BMI) quartile group at age 18  (four groups).40 The random sample is 2582
consists of 35% of Swedish men born between 1955 and 1967 and the outcome is an 2583
average of pre-fisc income over 7 years (age group: 32-38). Looking at the graphs of 2584
stochastic dominance reveals something that was already present in Lefranc et al. 2585
(2009b). The income CDFs of the different educational or parental-income types are 2586
quite close. The differences are more pronounced for IQ-types. Parametric results reveal 2587
that the three most important contributors to inequality of opportunity are parental 2588
income, IQ, and the type heterogeneity of the disturbance (which  may be due to effort, 2589
luck or unobserved type heterogeneity, because the parental-income and education group 2590
are still large). Looking at the Gini coefficient (the results are a bit sensitive to the 2591
measure, as usual), putting IQ aside, the other ‘social’ circumstances account for between 2592
15.3% and 18.7% of the overall Gini. That means that in the counterfactual situation 2593
where the only factors of inequality would be these social circumstances, the Gini 2594
coefficient would attain a modest value of 0.043 for the oldest cohort! The contribution 2595
of IQ represents about 12% of the overall Gini. So far, these results are very impressive 2596
and confirm that Sweden is close to reaching a situation of equal opportunity. Still, it will 2597
remain to see if introducing parental income in a continuous way and perhaps education 2598
of both mother and father, thus refining the typology, would alter the results significantly.  2599
 The results for Norway obtained by Aaberge and al. (2011) are built upon a 2600
coarser typology (three educational parental levels, to grow up in a large family or not, to 2601
be born in a main city or not , and birth cohort). Tranches are defined by relying upon the 2602
Roemer identification axiom.  The data come from a rich longitudinal set containing 2603
records for every Norwegian from 1967 to 2006, enabling one to build up a permanent 2604
income measure. The Gini coefficient in permanent income is as low as 0.17, and the 2605
authors graph Pen’s parade (the inverses of the permanent income CDFs)  for the three 2606
educational groups. These inverse CDF’s are quite close. The Gini coefficient 2607
corresponding to inequality of opportunity is about 0.05 suggesting that opportunity 2608
inequality accounts for about 28 percent of income inequality when the analysis is based 2609
on permanent income. Since the typology is coarser than in Björklund et al. (2012) for 2610
                                                
40 BMI is measured at a young age.  It would be far more controversial to put BMI on the 
circumstance side for older people.  Of course, there are genetic roots of obesity among 
some subjects, but the main determinant is lifestyle (see the discussion in Bricard et al. 
(2013)).
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Sweden, the results so far are compatible with a higher inequality of opportunity and 2611
likely a higher contribution of inequality of opportunity to overall inequality. Almas et al. 2612
(2010) use a different methodology and the results cannot be easily compared. 2613
Nevertheless, we can observe an upper bound for the impact of effort. If we consider the 2614
usual candidates for effort variables such as years of education, hours of work (for those 2615
who work), working in the public sector, county of residence, choice of university major, 2616
then effort’s raw contribution to the Gini in Norway in 1986 is about 25.5% in the pre-tax 2617
income when we do not sterilize effort variables of the impact of circumstances. 2618
However, the impact of parental background on effort variables is quite small. It 2619
represents one Gini point over a Gini of 0.26.2620
 Next, we will review results on the ‘poor achievers’ of the EOp class among 2621
developed countries, the US and Italy. Pistolesi (2009) uses panel data, the PSID from 2622
1968 to 2001, and he considers age, race, education of both parents, the region of birth 2623
and the occupation of the father as circumstances. The two responsibility variables are the 2624
years of education and the hours of work. Their conditional distributions are estimated 2625
non-parametrically against the vector of circumstances. Pistolesi then predicts two 2626
counterfactual distributions for both educational and working-duration distributions. In 2627
the first, the effect of unequal circumstances is removed, whereas each individual is 2628
assumed to have exerted the same effort in the second. The circumstances have a weaker 2629
impact on hours of work than on education, a finding quite common across empirical 2630
studies, and which makes sense. A presentation of the results with the Gini to allow 2631
comparisons with previous studies shows that the share of inequality due to 2632
circumstances in the direct unfairness sense is about 35% for a five-year average earnings 2633
at the mean point of the distribution. It is indisputably higher than in Sweden but it 2634
follows a quite remarkable decreasing trend over the period. If the results were confirmed, 2635
it would mean that the increase in inequality that has occurred in the US is not due to an 2636
increase in inequality of opportunity. Checchi and Peragine (2010) study the inequality of 2637
opportunity in Italy. There are three circumstances: parents’ education (five types), sex, 2638
and regions (North, South).  What is striking is that with such a coarse typology, they 2639
find that inequality of opportunity accounts for about 20% of overall income inequality in 2640
Italy -- that is, higher than the 16% in Sweden with a much finer typology.2641
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 Next we will turn to less developed countries. The Latin-American study by 2642
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) provides results that can be compared with previous studies. 2643
Circumstances are defined as ethnicity, father’s and mother’s occupation, and birth 2644
region, for Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Colombia and Peru. The number of 2645
types is more than one hundred for the first four countries and about fifty for the last two 2646
countries. The contribution of circumstances to inequality is quite high and it varies quite 2647
a lot across the six countries. If we look at income, Guatemala and Brazil have in 2648
common a high value of the share explained by observed circumstances, about one-third, 2649
followed by Panama (30%) and Ecuador (26%). The contribution of inequality of 2650
opportunity to total inequality is about 28% in Peru and only 23% in Colombia. However, 2651
these two countries have fewer types, which biases the estimates downward with respect 2652
to the other countries. The authors also provide estimates of the contribution of non-2653
responsibility characteristics to consumption inequality per capita, which may be more 2654
similar to permanent income. The degree to which inequality of opportunity explains 2655
inequality is even higher for some countries, over 50% for Guatemala. Ferreira et al 2656
(2011) study the case of Turkey, which has roughly the same level of development as 2657
Brazil, and find that on a sample of ever-married women aged 30–49, inequality of2658
opportunity accounts for at least 26% of overall inequality in imputed consumption,2659
which is by and large a lower value that those found for Latin American countries, except 2660
for Colombia. For African countries we will refer to the study of Cogneau and Mesple-2661
Soms (2008). The surveys that are selected are the only large-sample nationally 2662
representative surveys in Africa that provide information on parental background for 2663
adult respondents. They cover two countries under Britain’s former colonial rule, Ghana 2664
and Uganda, and three countries under France’s former colonial rule, Ivory Coast, Guinea, 2665
and Madagascar. The types are defined by a small number of occupational, educational 2666
and geographical circumstances. For the two most developed countries, Ivory Coast and 2667
Ghana, the Gini inequality of opportunity index is about 0.15 (the triple of what is found 2668
in Sweden) and it represents about one-third of overall inequality (0.45). The information 2669
is poorer for other countries but, given the results one has on a comparative basis, one can 2670
guess that the share of inequality of opportunity is even higher there.2671
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 All in all, it seems that the inequality of opportunity for income is highly 2672
correlated with inequality of income. This observation is confirmed by the high 2673
correlation (0.67) between these two kinds of inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient 2674
for western countries (Lefranc et al. (2009)). Moreover, this strong correlation seems a 2675
general pattern that does not depend on the outcome chosen. Indeed, working on the 2676
Retrospective Survey of SHARELIFE, which focuses on life histories of Europeans aged 2677
50 and over, Bricard et al. (2013) observe a positive correlation of about 0.39 between 2678
inequality of opportunity in health and health inequality. Furthermore, since lifestyles are 2679
documented in this dataset, the authors are able to show that inequalities of opportunity 2680
for health status in Europe represent on average half of the health inequalities due to both 2681
circumstances and effort (lifestyles).   There are, however, large variations across 2682
countries. The health indicator in this study is SAH (self-assessed health) but using 2683
mortality indicators as in Garcia-Gomez et al. (2012), the importance of lifestyles also 2684
comes out as a distinctive feature.  These authors use a rich dataset for the Netherlands 2685
(1998-2007), linking information about mortality, health events and lifestyles. They 2686
estimate a full structural model that reveals strong educational gradients in healthy 2687
lifestyles which in turn have the expected effect on mortality.2688
 We are at the very beginning of solid empirical analyses of inequality of 2689
opportunity. Analysis has been hampered so far by limitation of data sets and the 2690
intricacy of the issue.  For each recent paper beginning with Bourguignon et al. (2007), 2691
the same ritual sentence appears in the introduction, to the effect that  ‘this set of 2692
circumstance and effort variables is richer than those used so far in the existing empirical 2693
literature on inequality of opportunity.’  If this trend continues, we can be optimistic that, 2694
in the coming years, data sets will improve, as the stakes become clearer. 2695
2696
11. Conclusion 2697
 The main contribution of the equality-of-opportunity literature to the vast 2698
literature on inequality is to point out that the source of inequality matters from an ethical 2699
viewpoint.    Most would agree that effects of circumstances on persons’ well-being that 2700
are beyond the control of individuals should be rectified, while at least some differential 2701
outcomes due to choice are not compensable at the bar of justice.  Thus, measures of 2702
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inequality as such are not terribly useful – unless one is a simple outcome-egalitarian, 2703
who views all inequality as unjust.  To the extent that economists ignore this ethical 2704
principle – and popular view – their measurements of inequality will not persuade people 2705
to rectify it.2706
 As we said, the theory of equal opportunity involves both an equalizing aspect 2707
and a disequalizing one.   Some philosophers focus – we believe excessively – on the 2708
disequalizing aspect, which induces criticisms of the approach from the left.    We 2709
mention the work of Scheffler (2003) and Anderson (1999), both of whom criticize what 2710
they call ‘luck egalitarianism’ as too focused upon individual choice: to this they oppose 2711
a view of ‘democratic equality’ which involves treating all persons with equal dignity and 2712
respect.   Indeed, one would surely be sympathetic to their complaint, if the entirety of 2713
the equal-opportunity approach were limited to cases of expensive tastes, whether or not 2714
society should pay for the hospitalization of the motor cyclist who crashes having chosen 2715
not to wear a helmet, or even with the more socially important issue of the responsibility 2716
for smoking-related disease.    These examples focus upon the disequalizing aspect of the 2717
equal-opportunity view – that the effects of poor choices are not compensable in the strict 2718
interpretation of the view.   However, we believe that the main focus of the EOp view is 2719
upon its mandate for equalization of outcomes that are due to differential circumstances:2720
most urgently, at this juncture in history, for eliminating differences in income, health, 2721
and educational achievement which are due to the vastly different socio-economic 2722
backgrounds in which children are raised, due in large part to the institutions of our 2723
capitalist societies.  The bourgeois revolutions, which eliminated feudalism and 2724
inequality of opportunity due to arbitrary social status, although not complete (think of 2725
caste in India), marked a huge advance in the equalization of opportunities: but they 2726
replaced feudal inequality of opportunity with inequality of opportunity due to 2727
differential wealth.  (Of course, ancient forms of inequality of opportunity, due to gender, 2728
ethnicity, and race still remain as well.)  The Nordic social democracies have done most 2729
at eliminating inequality of opportunity due to income and wealth41.2730
                                                
41 One should also query, of those who advocate ‘democratic equality’ over the kind of 
equality of opportunity discussed here, whether democratic equality of the kind they 
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  We have characterized economic development earlier as an elimination of 2731
inequality of opportunity due to parental socio-economic status.  Assuming development 2732
continues globally, according to this measure, we will eventually replace the most 2733
important circumstance with – we conjecture—inequality due to natural talent.  Many 2734
people in the experiments we reported support the meritocratic view, that returns to 2735
natural talent are just.    Perhaps, as we succeed gradually in eliminating inequalities of 2736
important objectives that are due to differential wealth, the focus will then turn to 2737
inequalities due to differential natural talent.  This would not necessarily require that 2738
untalented people be compensated for not having access to the pleasure which talented 2739
people enjoy from exercising their talents, but it may well require that no income 2740
advantage accrue to the talented.  (The taxman will not bill you because you get great 2741
pleasure from singing in the shower.)   Think of the communist slogan, “From each 2742
according to his ability, to each according to his need.”  That slogan does not begrudge 2743
the psychological pleasure and social respect that talent garners, but advocates a complete 2744
separation of income from talent.2745
 Skeptics will say that markets will always be necessary in large and complex 2746
societies, and markets cannot operate efficiently if earnings are too sharply divorced from 2747
productive contribution.   But this view accepts without question the assumption that 2748
individuals always maximize selfishly against the tax regime, or other redistributive 2749
policy, which they face.    In other words, the incentive problem, so central to economic 2750
theory today, takes that problem as a fact of nature, like Newton’s laws of gravitation.   It 2751
is, however, not a fact of that kind, but rather a corollary to a particular human 2752
psychology, that has developed in a particular historical epoch, when material scarcity is 2753
still prevalent globally, and capitalist economic relations are virtually ubiquitous42.   It is 2754
                                                                                                                                            
envisage can possibly exist before the invidious inequalities due to circumstances are 
eliminated.   How can people treat each other as equals when massive material 
inequalities among them, due to luck, continue to exist? 
42 We do not claim that humans have no propensity to be self-interested, but rather that 
that propensity may be vastly overblown.  It is difficult to know how human psychology 
will change as material scarcity fades into the past. 
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quite possible (and we believe it to be so) that human material needs are limited, and an 2755
historical period will arrive, perhaps relatively soon, when they are more or less 2756
universally satisfied.  Keynes (1930) in fact argued that such an epoch was virtually upon 2757
us, at least in what he called the progressive countries, and that attitudes towards material 2758
acquisition would change radically over the next century.  If and when this occurs, it 2759
seems to us quite reasonable to conjecture that societies will attempt to eliminate 2760
differential rewards to talent, having by then done away with inequalities due to feudal 2761
status, and capitalist wealth.  The question of how an economic mechanism can 2762
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